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2Introduction
In social choice theory, the intent is to choose a winning alternative, given pref-
erences of voters. For the purposes of this thesis, we are only considering a choice
between three alternatives {x, y, z}. To understand how this is accomplished, we
must first determine how voters and their preferences are expressed. Here, we de-
fine a voter (denoted i) as a member of a continuum1, drawn from the unit interval
(i.e., i ∈ [0, 1]). This lets us measure the proportion of voters with various pref-
erence rankings. A voter’s preferences are expressed as an ordinal ranking of the
alternatives (where x ≻ y means that option x is preferred to option y).
A domain (denoted by U) is a collection of preference rankings, each of which
we express as a column vector. For example, consider the following domain:
U =
{
x y y
y x z
z z x
}
The third column vector

yz
x

 represents the preference ranking y ≻ z ≻ x. With
a specific profile (denoted by u), we can represent the relative proportion of voters
and their preferences about the alternatives. For example, consider the following
profile:
u =
p q 1 - p - q
x y y
y x z
z z x
In this profile, a proportion q of the voters have preference ranking

yx
z

. We can
similarly identify the other preference rankings and their weights in the profile.
Given a preference ranking of this form, how would we determine the winning
outcome? This can be accomplished by a voting rule. For the purposes of this
paper, given a profile of voter preferences u, and a collection of alternatives X , a
voting rule (denoted F ) selects a winner (if one exists). More formally, given a
set of alternatives X ⊆ {x, y, z}, a voting rule F maps each profile u on domain U
to an alternative in X . This is denoted F (u,X).2
Given this formulation of a voting rule, we still have not specified how the voting
rule actually selects the result. There are numerous methods to choose a winner.
We would not be happy with a voting rule that says “given options {x, y, z}, x
is always the winner, regardless of voter preferences.” (For example, a Russian
election where Vladimir Putin is on the ballot). So, we want voting rules to satisfy
certain desirable axioms. For example, consider the profile u that we defined above.
Intuitively, if a voting rule selected z as the winner, we might be dissatisfied with
that result, because clearly, everyone prefers option y over option z. (This is the
Pareto property, as is defined below).
1This will ensure that the chances of a tie are negligible, i.e., we say that ties are nongeneric.
2This definition only requires the voting rule to map to a winning alternative on generic profiles.
On a nongeneric profile, a voting rule can evaluate to ∅.
3Certain axioms are extremely natural:
Pareto (denoted P) - As we saw before, if one alternative (y) is preferred by
everyone to another alternative (z), then z should not be the alternative that is
selected by the voting rule. It also follows from this axiom that if everyone ranks
alternative y above every other option, then y should be the winner.
Anonymity (denoted A) - This tells us that if the names of voters are relabeled,
then the outcome of the voting rule should not change. To express this more
formally, we take some measure preserving permutation pi : [0, 1] → [0, 1] (i.e., for
any C ⊆ [0, 1], µ(C) = µ(pi(C))). Apply permutation pi to all voters i in some
profile u, so that each voter i has voter pi(i)’s preference rankings, and denote
the fully permuted profile as upi. To satisfy this property, it must be true that
F (u,X) = F (upi, X).
Neutrality (denoted N) - If we permute the names of the candidates on the
ballot (and accordingly adjust the voter preferences associated to them), then the
adjusted winner should be the permuted winning candidate.
For example, consider the following permutation on profile u:
σ(x) = y;σ(y) = z;σ(z) = x
uσ =
p q 1 - p - q
y z z
z y x
x x y
Suppose that the winner according to some voting rule F (u,X) = y. So then,
to satisfy Neutrality, it should be true that F (uσ, X) = σ(y) = z.
The above axioms are clearly ones that would be attractive for a voting rule to
fulfill. However, some other axioms in the voting literature are less obvious. In
particular, the next axiom is particularly controversial:
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (denoted IIA) - Let X be a collec-
tion of alternatives, and let X ′ be a collection of alternatives where x ∈ X ′ ⊂ X . If
alternative x is the winner F (u., X), then to satisfy IIA, x must also be the winner
F (u., X
′). In other words, dropping non-winning candidates from consideration
should not change who the winner is.
Surprisingly, these axioms are not easy to fulfill. This is apparent in the most
celebrated result of social choice theory, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (Arrow
1951).
Theorem (Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, as stated in Dasgupta and
Maskin 2019) Assume the domain U consists of all possible preference rankings
over {x, y, z}. There is no voting rule that satisfies P, A, N, and IIA.3
This result might seem disheartening - however, beyond this result, there is still
a wide variety of directions that voting theory can take. We can consider how to
restrict the domain of preferences. We can reconsider which axioms are included.
With these modifications, we can analyze how these restrictions limit the voting
rules that are possible. And that is what we will do!
First, we introduce some of the common voting rules:
3This theorem applies to all sets of 3 or more alternatives, but for the purposes of this thesis,
we are focusing on just the case of 3 alternatives.
4Rank-Order Voting a.k.a. Borda Count (Borda 1781) - The alternatives
are ranked by each voter (in the order of their preferences), and the alternatives are
scored according to the following rule: an alternative gets k points for each voter
that ranks it above k other alternatives. The highest scoring alternative wins. This
voting method dates back to 1781, and was proposed by Jean-Charles Borda.
Majority Rule a.k.a. Condorcet’s Method (Condorcet 1785) - Again,
the alternatives are ranked by each voter. Each pair of alternatives are compared
in a head-to-head contest (aggregating over all voters), and the winning option is
the alternative x where a majority of voters prefer x over any other opponent y.
This method also dates back to the 18th century (1785), and was championed by the
Marquis de Condorcet. (Borda and Condorcet were contemporaries and intellectual
foes - they disagreed on which voting rule was superior.)
Plurality Rule - Given the preference rankings of each voter, the alternative
that is ranked in the first spot by the most voters is declared the winner (even if
they are short of a majority)4. This method is used in U.S. elections (e.g., to elect
members of Congress, to determine the winner of each state’s electoral votes, for
many local elections).
Of course, there are many voting rules besides the methods described above.
However, in the spirit of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, Dasgupta and Maskin
(2019) show in their Theorem 6 that the Borda Count and Condorcet’s Method
are the only possible voting rules when certain intuitive axioms are imposed. This
thesis generalizes Dasgupta and Maskin’s Theorem 6 by relaxing a key axiom.
In Theorem 6, attention is restricted to rich domains:
A domain U is a rich domain if for each x ∈ X there exists some y, z ∈ X and
some preference ranking in the domain such that y ≻ x ≻ z. In other words, each
alternative must appear in a non-extremal place in some preference ranking in the
domain.
For example, consider the following domains:
U1 =
{ x x y z
y z z y
z y x x
}
U2 =
{ x x y y
y z z x
z y x z
}
(Clearly, U1 is not rich, while U2 is).
Additionally, their Theorem 6 replaces the common IIA axiom with Strategy-
Proofness.
Strategy-Proofness (denoted SP) - Consider a generic profile u on the domain
U , and alternatives X , and suppose that F (u,X) = x. Let the notation x ≻i y
denote that voter i prefers alternative x over alternative y. Consider all coalitions
C ⊆ [0, 1], and all profiles u′ where for all i /∈ C, ≻i = ≻
′
i. Then, for y = F (u
′, X),
there exists some i ∈ C such that x ≻i y.
Suppose that u represents the true preferences of the voters. For any strategic
profile u′, where members of the coalition C misreport their preferences, there is
some voter in the misreporting coalition who winds up with a worse result than
what they would have received had they reported their true preferences. Or, in
other words, if a coalition of voters can misreport and improve their outcome, then
4This definition of plurality rule makes sense given the preference rankings of voters - however,
in practice, plurality rule does not actually require voters to rank all alternatives (they only need
to report their one top choice).
5the voting rule is not Strategy Proof. Clearly, this is an appealing axiom, as we
want voters to be incentivized to report their true preference rankings, and to avoid
attempting to (potentially misguidedly) game the system for a better result.
Before stating Dasgupta and Maskin’s Theorem 6, we formally define the two
voting rules, Condorcet’s Method (denoted FC), and Borda Count (denoted FB):
Majority Rule (a.k.a. Condorcet’s Method) -
FC(u,X) = {x ∈ X |µ[i|x ≻i y] ≥
1
2
∀y 6= x, y ∈ X}
In other words, when considering the head-to-head comparisons of all pairs,
the Condorcet winner x is the one for which a majority prefer x to every other
alternative y.
Recall profile u that we defined above:
u =
p q 1 - p - q
x y y
y x z
z z x
For example, apply FC to profile u. We see that in the pairing of (x, y), x is
preferred to y with proportion p. And, in the comparison (x, z), x is preferred to z
with proportion p+ q. Finally, in the comparison (y, z), y is always preferred. This
tells us that z can never be the Condorcet winner. We also can see that if p > 12 ,
then x is the Condorcet winner.
However, note that Condorcet’s Method does not always select a winner. Con-
sider the following profile:
uc =
1/3 1/3 1/3
x y z
y z x
z x y
We apply FC to profile uc. We can see that a proportion
2
3 prefer x to y; a
proportion 23 prefer y to z, and a proportion
2
3 prefer z to x. This is a Condorcet
Cycle. According the head-to-head contests, we have that the overall electorate
prefers x ≻ y, y ≻ z, and z ≻ x. This means that no one can be the Condorcet
winner - giving us the Condorcet paradox (as noted by the Marquis de Condorcet).
Ranked-Choice Voting (a.k.a. Borda Count) -
FB(u,X) = {x ∈ X |
∫
ri(x)dµ(i) ≥
∫
ri(y)dµ(i) ∀y ∈ X}
(Here, the point score ri(x) = |{y ∈ X |x i y}|)
The score for each alternative is determined by integrating over the point scores
ri for all voters i. The point score ri(x) is measured as the number of candidates
that are ranked no higher than x by voter i. The Borda winner is the alternative
whose total score is higher than the score of any other candidate.
As an example, we can apply the Borda Count to profile u:
The score for alternative x is: 2p+ q
The score for alternative y is: p+ 2q + 2(1− p− q) = 2− p.
The score for alternative z is: 1− p− q
6Note that z can never be the winner under the Borda Count because this would
require that 1− p− q > 2− p, which would imply that q < −1, which is impossible.
Also note that p > 12 is not enough to guarantee that x is the Borda winner, even
though p > 12 guaranteed that x would be the Condorcet winner.
So, with this setup, we can state the theorem:
Theorem 6 (Dasgupta and Maskin) If F satisfies P, A, N, and SP on U,
and U is rich, then F = FB or F = FC .
The proof of this theorem proceeds in three steps. In the first step of the argu-
ment, it is shown that the Borda Count is the only voting rule that satisfies the
axioms on the Condorcet Cycle domain.
A Condorcet Cycle domain (on 3 alternatives) is:
UCC =
{ x y z
y z x
z x y
}
Next, for the second step, it is proven that no voting rule satisfies the axioms
on any expansion of the Condorcet Cycle domain. The final step shows that Con-
dorcet’s Method is the only voting rule that satisfies the axioms on any remaining
rich domain.
Richness is an important component of this result. Without this domain restric-
tion, there are non-rich domains where a voting rule other than FC and FB satisfy
the given axioms. Additionally, in the proof, richness also allows for permuting the
alternatives (applying axioms A and N), while still remaining in the same domain.
Returning to the definition of Strategy-Proofness, we notice that there is no limit
on the size of the coalition that deviates. However, manipulation on a large scale is
unrealistic in practice, so instead, we focus only on manipulations by coalitions of
a small size (ε). This allows us to formulate a less restrictive axiom, namely Weak
Strategy-Proofness (as suggested by Shengwu Li, and as defined by Dasgupta
and Maskin 2019).
A voting rule is manipulable on U if for all ε > 0, there exist some coalition C
where |C| < ε, profiles u and u′ (where for all i /∈ C, ≻i = ≻
′
i) and x, y ∈ X , where
x = F (u,X), y = F (u′, X), and y ≻i x for all i ∈ C.
Weak Strategy-Proofness (denoted WSP) - A voting rule F satisfies Weak
Strategy-Proofness on U if F is not manipulable on U .
In other words, if a coalition of arbitrarily small size can misreport their prefer-
ences and achieve an improved result, then the voting rule is manipulable.
Because Weak Strategy-Proofness allows for a larger class of voting rules to be
considered, when taken as an axiom, this leads to a generalization of Dasgupta and
Maskin’s Theorem 6.
So, for my senior thesis, I prove the following result:
Theorem If F satisfies P, A, N, and WSP on U, and U is rich, then F = FB
or F = FC .
This proof proceeds in three steps, as in the proof of Theorem 6. However,
this proof requires many more subcases, to check for the possibility of small group
misrepresentations. This utilizes a partitioning argument (based on ε), which is a
generalization of the argument used in the proof of Theorem 5 (Dasgupta and
Maskin). The proof also introduces iterative and inductive machinery to relate the
evaluation of profiles that differ by more than ε.
7Without further ado, we begin the proof.
8Step 1
First, we want to show that the Borda Count is the unique voting rule that
satisfies P, A, N, and WSP on the Condorcet Domain:
UCC =
{
x y z
y z x
z x y
}
Because WSP is less restrictive than SP, we know from Barbie et al. 2006 that
FB also satisfies WSP on the Condorcet Domain. (By properties of the Borda
Count, FB always satisfies P, A, N).
We consider the following profile:
u. =
a b 1 - a - b
x y z
y z x
z x y
Since UCC is symmetric, for this entire step, we can assume without loss of
generality that x is the winner according to the Borda Count. This means that:
2a+ (1− a− b) > a+ 2b
2a+ (1− a− b) > b + 2(1− a− b)
Assume that F is some voting rule that satisfies P, A, N, and WSP, and that
F 6= FB. Fix ε > 0.
Step 1, Case I: Suppose that according to the Borda Count, y beats z.
So, we have the following inequalities:
a+ 1− b > a+ 2b > 2− 2a− b
a+ b >
2
3
a >
1
3
> b
1.I.1 Assume that F has the following evaluation:
F (u.) = y (A1)
Consider the permutation σ on u., and the resulting profile, where σ(x) =
z, σ(y) = x, σ(z) = y:
u1 =
a b 1 - a - b
z x y
x y z
y z x
=
b 1 - a - b a
x y z
y z x
z x y
By A and N, we have:
F (u1) = x (A2)
1.I.1.1: Suppose that 1− a− b ≥ b
9Case 1.I.1.1.1 0 ≤ a− b < ε
In this case, voters in profile u. with preferences

xy
z

 will want to improve
their outcome. A weight of a − (1 − a − b) will misreport as

zx
y

, and a weight
of (1 − a − b) − b will misreport as

yz
x

. This will have a total coalition size of
2a− 1 + b + 1 − a − 2b = a− b < ε. It will induce profile u1 and evaluation (A2),
giving improved result x. This would contradict WSP, so Case 1.I.1.1.1 can not
hold.
Case 1.I.1.1.2 ε ≤ a− b < 2ε
Consider the following profile:
u2 =
b + (k + m) 1 - a - b - k a - m
x y z
y z x
z x y
Where: k = 1−a−2b2 ; m =
2a+b−1
2
Suppose that F (u2) 6= x. But then, note that voters in profile u2 with preferences
xy
z

 would form a coalition of size k+m and misreport as

yz
x

 with a weight of
k, and would misreport as

zx
y

 with a weight of m. This would induce profile u1,
and would result in improved result x. This would contradict WSP, implying that
F (u2) = x.
But then, in profile u., voters with preferences

xy
z

 would want to induce profile
u2.
Note that the following weights are equivalent:
a− (k +m) = b + (k +m)
b+ k = 1− a− b− k
1− a− b+m = a−m
So then, from profile u., voters with true preferences

xy
z

 would misreport as

yz
x

 with a weight of k, and would misreport as

zx
y

 with a weight of m (for a
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total coalition size of k+m < ε). This would form profile u2 and improved outcome
x. This would contradict WSP, so Case 1.I.1.1.2 does not hold.
Case 1.I.1.1.n+1 nε ≤ a− b < (n+ 1)ε
Again, as assumptions for this step, we have that:
F (u.) = y (A1)
F (u1) = x (A2)
Recall that:
u1 =
a b 1 - a - b
z x y
x y z
y z x
=
b 1 - a - b a
x y z
y z x
z x y
Consider the following profile:
u(j) =
b + (jk′ + jm′) 1 - a - b - jk′ a - jm′
x y z
y z x
z x y
(Where k′ = 1−a−2b
n+1 ; m
′ = 2a+b−1
n+1 , and j iterates from 1 to n).
Suppose that F (u(1)) 6= x. But then, voters in profile u(1) with preferences

xy
z


would misreport as

yz
x

 with a weight of k′, and would misreport as

zx
y

 with a
weight of m′ (for a total coalition size of k′+m′ < ε). This would induce profile u1,
and improved result x. And, this would contradict WSP, meaning that F (u(1)) = x.
Now, assume that F (u(j)) = x for some general 1 ≤ j < n. We can show that
F (u(j+1)) = x. Suppose instead that F (u(j+1)) 6= x. But then, note that voters
in profile u(j+1) with preferences

xy
z

 would misreport as

yz
x

 with a weight of
k′, and would misreport as

zx
y

 with a weight of m′ (for a total coalition size of
k′+m′ < ε. This would induce profile u(j), and improved result x. And, this would
contradict WSP. Instead, it must be true that F (u(j+1)) = x.
This means that for the following profile:
u(n) =
b + (nk′ + nm′) 1 - a - b - nk′ a - nm′
x y z
y z x
z x y
F (u(n)) = x
Then, note that:
11
b + (nk′ + nm′) = b+ (
n(a− b)
n+ 1
) =
(n+ 1)b+ na− nb
n+ 1
=
na+ b
n+ 1
=
(n+ 1)a− (a− b)
n+ 1
= a− (k′ +m′)
Similarly, it is also true that:
1− a− b− nk′ = b + k′
a− nm′ = 1− a− b+m′
So, profile u(n) is exactly equivalent to the following:
u(n) =
a - (k′ + m′) b + k′ 1 - a - b + m′
x y z
y z x
z x y
But then, those in profile u. with preferences

xy
z

 will form a coalition of size
k′+m′, and misreport as

yz
x

 with weight k′, and misreport as

zx
y

 with weight
m′. This will induce profile u(n) and improved result x, contradicting WSP. This
means that this case in general fails to satisfy the properties, and we have that
1.I.1.1 cannot hold.
1.I.1.2: Suppose instead that 1− a− b < b.
For this case, we consider the following profile:
u3 =
1 - 2b b b
x y z
y z x
z x y
1.I.1.2.1 Suppose that F (u3) = x (A3).
We are still assuming that:
F (u.) = y (A1)
Case 1.I.1.2.1.1 0 ≤ 2b+ a− 1 < ε
If F (u3) = x, then voters in profile u. with preferences

xy
z

 will form a coalition
of size 2b+ a− 1, and misreport as

zx
y

. This will induce profile u3 and improved
result x, which would contradict WSP. So, in this case, F (u3) 6= x.
Case 1.I.1.2.1.2 ε ≤ 2b+ a− 1 < 2ε
Again, for this case, we have:
12
F (u.) = y (A1)
And, we are assuming:
F (u3) = x (A3)
Consider the following profile:
u4 =
a - k b 1 - a - b + k
x y z
y z x
z x y
(Here, k = 2b+a−12 . Note that the definition of k is local to this case.)
Also:
a− k = 1− 2b+ k
1− a− b+ k = b− k
So:
u4 =
1 - 2b + k b b - k
x y z
y z x
z x y
Suppose that F (u4) 6= x. But then, voters in u4 with preferences

xy
z

 will
form a coalition of size k, and misreport as

zx
y

. This will induce profile u3 and
improved result x, which would contradict WSP. So, F (u4) = x.
But then, note that voters in profile u. with preferences

xy
z

 will misreport as

zx
y

 with a weight of k. This will induce profile u4, and achieve improved result
x, contradicting WSP. So, this case fails to hold.
Case 1.I.1.2.1.n+1 nε ≤ 2b+ a− 1 < (n+ 1)ε
For this case, we have:
F (u.) = y (A1)
And, we are assuming:
F (u3) = x (A3)
13
u(j) =
1 - 2b + jk′ b b - jk′
x y z
y z x
z x y
(Here, j iterates from 1 to n, and k′ = 2b+a−1
n+1 . Also, note that this definition of
k′ and u(j) is local to this case.)
We consider:
u(1) =
1 - 2b + k′ b b - k′
x y z
y z x
z x y
Suppose that F (u(1)) 6= x. But then, voters in u(1) with preferences

xy
z

 will
form a coalition of size k′, and misreport as

zx
y

. This will induce profile u3,
and achieve improved outcome x, contradicting WSP. So, it must be the case that
F (u(1)) = x.
Now we assume that for some general j that F (u(j)) = x. We can show that
F (u(j+1)) = x. Suppose instead that F (u(j+1)) 6= x. But then, voters in u(j+1)
with preferences

xy
z

 will form a coalition of size k′, and misreport as

zx
y

. This
will induce profile u(j), and will achieve improved outcome x. This would contradict
WSP, so, F (u(j+1)) = x. This is true for any j.
In particular, we have:
u(n) =
1 - 2b + nk′ b b - nk′
x y z
y z x
z x y
F (u(n)) = x (A4)
Note that:
1− 2b+ nk′ = 1− 2b+
n(2b+ a− 1)
n+ 1
=
=
na− 2b+ 1
n+ 1
= a−
2b+ a− 1
n+ 1
= a− k′
Likewise:
b− nk′ = 1− a− b + k′
So, profile u(n) is exactly equivalent to the following profile (with relabeled
weights):
14
u(n) =
a - k′ b 1 - a - b + k′
x y z
y z x
z x y
In profile u., voters with preferences

xy
z

 will form a coalition of size k′, and mis-
report as

zx
y

. This will induce profile u(n) and evaluation (A4), giving improved
result x over y. This would contradict WSP. This means that our supposition that
F (u3) = x is not possible. So, this case also cannot hold, and concludes 1.I.1.2.1.
1.I.1.2.2 Now suppose that F (u3) = y.
Recall that we are still in the case where 1 − a − b < b. Apply permutation σ
to u3 (where σ(x) = z, σ(y) = x, σ(z) = y). From A and N, this results in the
following profile and evaluation:
u5 =
b b 1 - 2b
x y z
y z x
z x y
F (u5) = x (A5)
Note that we are still assuming:
F (u.) = y (A1)
Case 1.I.1.2.2.1 0 ≤ a− b < ε
But then, voters in u. with preferences

xy
z

 will form a coalition of size a−b < ε,
and misreport as

zx
y

. This will induce profile u5 and evaluation (A5), giving
improved result x over y. This would contradict WSP, so Case 1.I.1.2.2.1 cannot
hold.
Case 1.I.1.2.2.n+1 nε ≤ a− b < (n+ 1)ε
Again, we have:
F (u.) = y (A1)
And, we are assuming:
F (u5) = x (A5)
Consider the following profile:
15
u(j) =
b + jk′ b 1 - 2b - jk′
x y z
y z x
z x y
(Here, j iterates from 1 to n, and k′ = a−b
n+1 . Again, note that the definitions for
k′, n, u(j) are local to this section).
We consider the profile:
u(1) =
b + k′ b 1 - 2b - k′
x y z
y z x
z x y
Suppose that F (u(1)) 6= x. But then, voters in profile u(1) with preferences

xy
z


will form a coalition of size k′ < ε, and misreport as

zx
y

. This will induce profile
u5 and evaluation (A5), giving improved result x over y. This would contradict
WSP, meaning that F (u(1)) = x.
Now, for a general j, assume that F (u(j)) = x. We can show that F (u(j+1)) =
x. Suppose instead that F (u(j+1)) 6= x. But then, voters in profile u(j+1) with
preferences

xy
z

 will form a coalition of size k′ < ε, and misreport as

zx
y

, which
would induce profile u(j) and improved result x. This would contradict WSP. So,
in general, F (u(j)) = x.
In particular, we have the following profile and evaluation:
u(n) =
b + nk′ b 1 - 2b - nk′
x y z
y z x
z x y
F (u(n)) = x (A6)
Note that:
b+ nk′ = b+
n(a− b)
n+ 1
=
b+ na
n+ 1
=
(n+ 1)a− a+ b
n+ 1
= a− k′
Similarly, it is true that:
1− 2b− nk′ = 1− a− b+ k′
So, profile u(n) is equivalent to the following relabeling of weights:
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u(n) =
a - k′ b 1 - a - b + k′
x y z
y z x
z x y
We have that F (u(n)) = x. But then, in profile u., voters with preferences

xy
z


will form a coalition of size k′, and misreport as

zx
y

. This will induce profile u(n)
and evaluation (A6), giving improved result x over y. This would contradict WSP.
So, this case also cannot hold, meaning that for F (u3) 6= y.
1.I.1.2.3 Finally, suppose that F (u3) = z.
Again, we consider profile u1:
u1 =
b 1 - a - b a
x y z
y z x
z x y
Recall that:
F (u1) = x (A2)
Also note that for this case, we have that b > 1− a− b.
Case 1.I.1.2.3.1 0 ≤ a− b < ε Here, voters in profile u1 with preferences

zx
y


will misreport as

xy
z

 with a weight of 1 − 3b, and will misreport as

yz
x

 with
a weight of 2b + a − 1 (for a total coalition size of a − b < ε). This would induce
profile u3, achieving improved outcome z. This would contradict WSP.
Case 1.I.1.2.3.n+1 nε ≤ a− b < (n+ 1)ε
Consider the following profile:
u(j) =
1 - 2b - jk b - jm b + j(k + m)
x y z
y z x
z x y
(Here, k = 1−3b
n+1 , m =
2b+a−1
n+1 , and j iterates from 1 to n. Also note that this
definition of u(j) is local to this case).
Suppose that F (u(1)) 6= z. But then, voters in profile u(1) with preferences

zx
y


will misreport as

xy
z

 with a weight of k, and will misreport as

yz
x

 with a weight
of m (for a total coalition size of k +m < ε). This would induce profile u3, and
improved result z. This would contradict WSP, meaning that F (u(1)) = z.
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Now suppose for a general j that F (u(j)) = z. We can show that F (u(j+1)) = z
as well. Suppose instead that F (u(j+1)) 6= z. But then, voters in profile u(j+1) with
preferences

zx
y

 will misreport as

xy
z

 with a weight of k, and will misreport
as

yz
x

 with a weight of m (for a total coalition size of k +m < ε). This would
induce profile u(j), and would achieve improved result z, contradicting WSP. So,
F (u(j+1)) = z. This is true for any j.
In particular, we have this for:
u(n) =
1 - 2b - nk b - nm b + n(k + m)
x y z
y z x
z x y
Note that:
1− 2b− nk = b+ k
b− nm = 1− a− b +m
b+ n(k +m) = a− (k +m)
So:
u(n) =
b + k 1 - a - b + m a - (k + m)
x y z
y z x
z x y
But then, voters in profile u1 with preferences

zx
y

 will misreport as

xy
z

 with
a weight of k, and will misreport as

yz
x

 with a weight of m (for a total coalition
size of k + m < ε). This would induce profile u(n), and improved result z. This
would contradict WSP, meaning that this case also fails.
So, in general, we see that 1.I.1 is not possible - when y beats z according to
the Borda count, it cannot be true that F (u.) = y.
1.I.2 Now we assume that F has the following evaluation on u.:
F (u.) = z (A7)
(Or, with u. written out):
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F


a b 1 - a - b
x y z
y z x
z x y

 = z (A7)
Apply permutation σ to this profile, where σ(x) = z, σ(y) = x, σ(z) = y:
This gives us profile u1, and the following evaluation:
u1 =
a b 1 - a - b
z x y
x y z
y z x
=
b 1 - a - b a
x y z
y z x
z x y
F (u1) = y (A8)
1.I.2.1 Suppose that 1− a− b ≥ b.
Case 1.I.2.1.1 0 ≤ a− b < ε
Note that voters in profile u. with preferences

xy
z

 will want to improve their
outcome. A weight of a − (1 − a − b) will misreport as

zx
y

, and a weight of
(1 − a − b) − b will misreport as

yz
x

. This will induce profile u1 and evaluation
(A8), resulting in improved outcome y. This will have a total coalition size of
2a − 1 + b + 1 − a − 2b = a − b < ε. This would contradict WSP, meaning that
Case 1.I.2.1.1 cannot hold.
Case 1.I.2.1.n+1 nε ≤ a− b < (n+ 1)ε
Consider the following profile:
u(j) =
a - j(k + m) b + jk 1 - a - b + jm
x y z
y z x
z x y
(Here, k = 1−a−2b
n+1 ; m =
2a+b−1
n+1 . Also note that these definitions of u
(j) and
the weights k and m are local to this case).
First consider F (u(1)). Suppose that F (u(1)) 6= z. But then, note that voters in
profile u. with preferences

xy
z

 will want to improve their outcome. A weight of k
will misreport as

yz
x

, and a weight of m will misreport as

zx
y

. This will induce
profile u(1), giving an improved outcome over z. This deviation will have a total
coalition size of k +m = a−b
n+1 < ε. This would contradict WSP, so F (u
(1)) = z.
Now, we assume that F (u(j)) = z for some general j. We want to show that
F (u(j+1)) = z. Suppose that F (u(j+1)) 6= z. But then, in profile u(j), voters with
19
preferences

xy
z

 will misrepresent: a weight of k will misreport as

yz
x

, and a
weight of m will misreport as

zx
y

. This will induce profile u(j+1), and result in
the improved outcome over z. This would contradict WSP, so, in general, we know
that F (u(j)) = z for all j.
This tells us the evaluation for the following profile:
u(n) =
a - n(k + m) b + nk 1 - a - b + nm
x y z
y z x
z x y
F (u(n)) = z
Note that the following weights are equivalent:
a− n(k +m) =
(n+ 1)a− na+ nb
n+ 1
=
a+ nb
n+ 1
= b+ (k +m)
b+ nk =
(n+ 1)b+ n− na− 2nb
n+ 1
=
b− nb+ n− na
n+ 1
= 1− a− b− k
1− a− b+ nm = a−m
So, equivalently for u(n), we have:
u(n) =
b + (k + m) 1 - a - b - k a - m
x y z
y z x
z x y
We recall that F (u1) = y. Voters in profile u
(n) will misreport their preferences
as

yz
x

 with a weight of k, and a weight of m will misreport as

zx
y

. This will
induce profile u1 and evaluation (A8), yielding improved outcome y. So, in general,
this case cannot hold, and this concludes 1.I.2.1.
1.I.2.2 Now we suppose that b > 1− a− b.
We apply permutation ν to profile u. (where ν(x) = y, ν(y) = z, ν(z) = x). By
A, N, and (A7), this gives us:
u6 =
1 - a - b a b
x y z
y z x
z x y
F (u6) = x (A9)
Case 1.I.2.2.1 0 ≤ 2a+ b− 1 < ε
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Voters in profile u. with preferences

xy
z

 will misreport: a weight of (a − b)
will misreport as

yz
x

, and a weight of (2b + a − 1) will misreport as

zx
y

. The
resulting coalition size is 2a+ b − 1 < ε. This will induce profile u6 and improved
outcome x, which would contradict WSP. So, Case 1.I.2.2.1 cannot hold.
Case 1.I.2.2.n+1 nε ≤ 2a+ b− 1 < (n+ 1)ε
Now, consider the following profile:
u(j) =
a - j(k + m) b + jk 1 - a - b + jm
x y z
y z x
z x y
(Here, k = a−b
n+1 , m =
2b+a−1
n+1 , and j iterates from 1 to n. Note that the definition
of u(j) is local to this case).
Consider F (u(1)). Suppose that F (u(1)) 6= z. But then, voters in profile u. with
preferences

xy
z

 will misreport: a weight of k will misreport as

yz
x

, and a weight
of m will misreport as

zx
y

. The resulting coalition size is k +m = 2a+b−1
n+1 < ε.
This would induce profile u(1), and give an improved outcome over z. This would
contradict WSP, so, we know that F (u(1)) = z.
Suppose for some j that F (u(j)) = z. We can show that F (u(j+1)) = z. Suppose
instead that F (u(j+1) 6= z. But then, voters in F (u(j)) with preferences

xy
z

 will
misreport: a weight of k will misreport as

yz
x

, and a weight of m will misreport
as

zx
y

. Again, the total coalition size is k +m < ε. This would induce profile
u(j+1) and an improved outcome over z for those who deviated. So, this would
contradict WSP, meaning that F (u(j+1)) = z.
This means that:
u(n) =
a - n(k + m) b + nk 1 - a - b + nm
x y z
y z x
z x y
F (u(n)) = z
Note that:
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a− n(k +m) = 1− a− b+ (k +m)
b+ nk =
b(n+ 1) + n(a− b)
n+ 1
=
b+ na
n+ 1
=
(n+ 1)a− (a− b)
n+ 1
= a− k
1− a− b+ nm =
n+ 1− na− a− nb− b+ 2nb+ na− n
n+ 1
=
=
1− a− 2b+ b+ nb
n+ 1
=
(n+ 1)b− (2b+ a− 1)
n+ 1
= b −m
So:
u(n) =
1 - a - b + (k + m) a - k b - m
x y z
y z x
z x y
So then, voters in profile u(n) with preferences

xy
z

 will misreport: a weight
of k will misreport as

yz
x

, and a weight of m will misreport as

zx
y

. This will
induce profile u6, and improved result x. This contradicts WSP, meaning that
Case 1.I.2.2.n+1 cannot hold.
This concludes 1.I.2, and means that Case I of Step 1 is impossible.
So, we move on to Case II of Step 1.
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Step 1, Case II: Now suppose that by the Borda Count, z beats y.
So, we have the following inequalities:
a+ 1− b > 2− 2a− b > a+ 2b
a+ b <
2
3
a >
1
3
> b
Again, we are considering the following profile:
u. =
a b 1 - a - b
x y z
y z x
z x y
1.II.1 Suppose that F has the following evaluation on u.:
F (u.) = z (A10)
We apply permutation σ to u. (where σ(x) = z, σ(y) = x, σ(z) = y), resulting in
profile u1 from before, and the following evaluation:
u1 =
a b 1 - a - b
z x y
x y z
y z x
=
b 1 - a - b a
x y z
y z x
z x y
F (u1) = y (A11)
1.II.1.1 Suppose that a ≥ 1− a− b.
And, note that 1− a− b > b.
Case 1.II.1.1.1 0 ≤ a− b < ε
Voters in profile u. with preferences

xy
z

 misreport to improve their outcome,
where a weight of 1 − a − 2b will misreport as

yz
x

, and a weight of 2a − 1 + b
will misreport as

zx
y

. This deviation has a coalition size of a− b < ε. This will
induce profile u1 and evaluation (A11), for improved result y.
Case 1.II.1.1.n+1 nε ≤ a− b < (n+ 1)ε
Again, by assumption, we have that:
F (u.) = z (A10)
And, we are assuming:
F (u1) = y (A11)
Consider the following profile:
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u(j) =
a - (jk + jm) b + jk 1 - a - b + jm
x y z
y z x
z x y
(Here, k = 1−a−2b
n+1 ;m =
2a+b−1
n+1 , and j iterates from 1 to n. Also note that this
definition of u(j) is local to this case).
Suppose that F (u(1)) 6= z. But then, voters in profile u. with preferences

xy
z


would misreport as

yz
x

 with a weight of k, and would misreport as

zx
y

 with
a weight of m (for a total coalition size of k +m < ε). This would induce profile
u(1), and an improved result over z. And, this would contradict WSP, meaning
that F (u(1)) = z.
Now, assume that F (u(j)) = z for some general 1 ≤ j < n. We can show that
F (u(j+1)) = z. Suppose instead that F (u(j+1)) 6= z. But then, note that voters
in profile u(j) with preferences

xy
z

 would misreport as

yz
x

 with a weight of
k, and would misreport as

zx
y

 with a weight of m (for a total coalition size of
k+m < ε). This would induce profile u(j+1), and an improved result over z, which
would contradict WSP. Instead, it must be true that F (u(j+1)) = z.
This means that for the following profile:
u(n) =
a - (nk + nm) b + nk 1 - a - b + nm
x y z
y z x
z x y
F (u(n)) = z
Then, note that:
a− (nk + nm) = b+ (k +m)
Similarly, it is also true that:
b+ nk = 1− a− b − k
1− a− b+ nm = a−m
So, profile u(n) is exactly equivalent to the following:
u(n) =
b + (k + m) 1 - a - b - k a - m
x y z
y z x
z x y
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But then, those in profile u(n) with preferences

xy
z

 will form a coalition of
size k + m, and misreport as

yz
x

 with weight k, and misreport as

zx
y

 with
weight m. This will induce profile u1 and evaluation (A11), yielding improved
result y, contradicting WSP. This means that this case in general fails to satisfy
the properties, and we have that 1.II.1.1 cannot hold.
1.II.1.2 Now assume instead that a < 1− a− b.
Consider the following profile:
u7 =
a 1 - 2a a
x y z
y z x
z x y
1.II.1.2.1 Suppose that F (u7) = x (A12).
Also, recall that we are assuming:
F (u.) = z (A10)
Case 1.II.1.2.1.1 0 ≤ 1− 2a− b < ε
Note that voters in profile u7 with preferences

yz
x

 will misreport their pref-
erences as

zx
y

 with a weight of 1 − 2a − b < ε. This will induce profile u., and
achieve improved outcome z. This would contradict WSP, so Case 1.II.1.2.1.1
fails.
Case 1.II.1.2.1.n+1 nε ≤ 1− 2a− b < (n+ 1)ε
Now, consider the following profile:
u(j) =
a 1 - 2a - jk a + jk
x y z
y z x
z x y
(Where k = 1−2a−b
n+1 , and j iterates from 1 to n. Also, note that this definition
of u(j) is local to this case).
Suppose that F (u(1)) 6= x. But then, voters in profile u7 with preferences

yz
x


will misreport their preferences as

zx
y

 with a weight of k < ε. This would induce
profile u(1) and an improved result over x, contradicting WSP. So, F (u(1)) = x.
Now suppose that F (u(j)) = x for some general j. We can show that F (u(j+1)) =
x. Suppose instead that F (u(j+1)) 6= x. But then, voters in profile u(j) with
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preferences

yz
x

 will misreport their preferences as

zx
y

 with a weight of k < ε.
This would induce profile u(j+1) and an improved result over x, contradicting WSP.
This means that F (u(j+1)) = x for any general j.
Note that in particular, we have this for:
u(n) =
a 1 - 2a - nk a + nk
x y z
y z x
z x y
=
a b + k 1 - a - b - k
x y z
y z x
z x y
But then, voters in profile u(n) with preferences

yz
x

 will misreport their pref-
erences as

zx
y

 with a weight of k < ε. This will induce profile u., and achieve
improved outcome z over x. This contradicts WSP, so in general, Case 1.II.1.2.1
cannot hold.
1.II.1.2.2 Now suppose that F (u7) = y (A13).
Again, recall that we are assuming:
F (u.) = z (A10)
Apply permutation σ to u7, where σ(x) = z, σ(y) = x, σ(z) = y. By properties
A and N, this gives us:
u8 =
1 - 2a a a
x y z
y z x
z x y
F (u8) = x (A14)
Case 1.II.1.2.2.1 0 ≤ 3a− 1 < ε
Note that voters in profile u7 with preferences

xy
z

 will misreport their pref-
erences as

yz
x

 with a coalition size of 3a− 1 < ε. This would induce profile u8,
and would achieve improved result x, contradicting WSP. So, Case 1.II.1.2.2.1
cannot hold.
Case 1.II.1.2.2.n+1 nε ≤ 3a− 1 < (n+ 1)ε
Now, consider the following profile:
u(j) =
1 - 2a + jk a - jk a
x y z
y z x
z x y
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(Here, k = 3a−1
n+1 , and j iterates from 1 to n. Again, we note that this definition
of u(j) is local to this case).
Suppose that F (u(1)) 6= x. But then, voters in profile u(1) with preferences

xy
z


will misreport their preferences as

yz
x

 with a coalition size of k < ε. This would
induce profile u8, and would achieve improved result x, contradicting WSP. So,
F (u(1)) = x.
Now, we assume that F (u(j)) = x for some general j. We can show that
F (u(j+1)) = x as well. Suppose instead that F (u(j+1)) 6= x. But then, note
that voters in profile u(j+1) with preferences

xy
z

 will misreport their preferences
as

yz
x

 with a coalition size of k < ε. This misrepresentation would induce profile
u(j), and would lead to improved result x. This would contradict WSP, meaning
that F (u(j+1)) = x for any j.
In particular, this is true for the following profile:
u(n) =
1 - 2a + nk a - nk a
x y z
y z x
z x y
=
a - k 1 - 2a + k a
x y z
y z x
z x y
But then, voters in profile u7 with preferences

xy
z

 will misreport their pref-
erences as

yz
x

 with a coalition size of k < ε, inducing profile u(n) and achieving
improved result x over y. This would contradict WSP. So, 1.II.1.2.2 also cannot
hold.
1.II.1.2.3 Now we suppose that F (u7) = z (A15).
Again, by assumption for 1.II.1, we have:
F (u.) = z (A10)
Apply permutation σ to u7.
This gives us profile u8 and the following evaluation (from properties A and N):
u8 =
1 - 2a a a
x y z
y z x
z x y
F (u8) = y (A16)
Case 1.II.1.2.3.1 0 ≤ 3a− 1 < ε
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Note that voters in profile u7 with preferences

xy
z

 will misreport their prefer-
ences as

yz
x

 with a coalition size of 3a− 1 < ε. This would induce profile u8, and
would achieve improved result y over z contradicting WSP. So, Case 1.II.1.2.3.1
cannot hold.
Case 1.II.1.2.3.n+1 nε ≤ 3a− 1 < (n+ 1)ε
Now, consider the following profile:
u(j) =
a - jk 1 - 2a + jk a
x y z
y z x
z x y
(Here, k = 3a−1
n+1 , and j iterates from 1 to n. Again, we note that this definition
of u(j) is local to this case).
Suppose that F (u(1)) 6= z. But then, voters in profile u7 with preferences

xy
z


will misreport their preferences as

yz
x

 with a coalition size of k < ε. This would
induce profile u(1), and would achieve an improved result over z contradicting WSP.
So, F (u(1)) = z.
Now, we suppose for a general j that F (u(j)) = z. We can then show that
F (u(j+1)) = z. Suppose instead that F (u(j+1)) 6= z. But then, voters in profile u(j)
with preferences

xy
z

 will misreport their preferences as

yz
x

 with a coalition size
of k < ε. This would induce profile u(j+1), and would achieve an improved outcome
over z. This would contradict WSP, so, for any general j, F (u(j+1)) = z.
In particular, note that this is true for the following profile:
u(n) =
a - nk 1 - 2a + nk a
x y z
y z x
z x y
=
1 - 2a + k a - k a
x y z
y z x
z x y
But then, note that voters in profile u(n) with preferences

xy
z

 will misreport
their preferences as

yz
x

 with a coalition size of k < ε. This will induce profile u8
and evaluation (A16), giving improved result y over z. This contradicts WSP.
So, these cases are exhaustive for 1.II.1, and we conclude that when z beats y
according to the Borda count, then F (u.) 6= z. We move on to 1.II.2
1.II.2 Now suppose that F has the following evaluation on u.:
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u. =
a b 1 - a - b
x y z
y z x
z x y
F (u.) = y (A17)
Apply permutation σ to profile u. and evaluation (A17) where σ(x) = z, σ(y) =
x, σ(z) = y. This gives us:
u1 =
a b 1 - a - b
z x y
x y z
y z x
=
b 1 - a - b a
x y z
y z x
z x y
By A and N, we have:
F (u1) = x (A18)
1.II.2.1 Suppose that a ≥ 1− a− b
Again, note that 1− a− b > b.
Case 1.II.2.1.1 0 ≤ a− b < ε
In this case, voters in profile u. with preferences

xy
z

 will misreport as

zx
y


with a weight of a−(1−a−b) and will misreport as

yz
x

 with a weight of 1−a−2b,
for a total coalition size of a−b < ε. This will induce profile u1 and improved result
x. This would contradict WSP, meaning that this case cannot hold.
Case 1.II.2.1.n+1 nε ≤ a− b < (n+ 1)ε
Now, consider the following profile:
u(j) =
b + jk + jm 1 - a - b - jk a - jm
x y z
y z x
z x y
(Where k = 1−a−2b
n+1 ; m =
2a+b−1
n+1 , and j iterates from 1 to n. Also, note that
the definition of u(j) is local to this case).
Suppose that F (u(1)) 6= x. But then, voters in profile u(1) with preferences

xy
z


will misreport as

yz
x

 with a weight of k and will misreport as

zx
y

 with a weight
of m. This would induce profile u1 and evaluation (A18), for improved outcome x.
This would contradict WSP, so F (u(1)) = x.
Now assume for some general j that F (u(j)) = x. We can show that F (u(j+1)) =
x. Suppose instead that F (u(j+1)) 6= x. But then, voters in profile u(j+1) with
29
preferences

xy
z

 will misreport as

yz
x

 with a weight of k and will misreport as

zx
y

 with a weight of m. This would induce profile u(j) and an improved outcome
x. This would contradict WSP, meaning that for any general j, F (u(j+1)) = x.
In particular, we have this for:
u(n) =
b + nk + nm 1 - a - b - nk a - nm
x y z
y z x
z x y
Note that:
b+ n(k +m) = a− (k +m)
1− a− b− nk = b + k
a− nm = 1− a− b+m
So:
u(n) =
a - (k + m) b + k 1 - a - b + m
x y z
y z x
z x y
But then, note that voters in profile u. with preferences

xy
z

 will misreport as

yz
x

 with a weight of k and will misreport as

zx
y

 with a weight of m, for a
total coalition size of k +m < ε. This would induce profile u(n) and an improved
outcome x. This would contradict WSP. So, in general, we see that 1.II.2.1 fails
to hold.
1.II.2.2 Suppose that a < 1− a− b.
Consider the following profile:
u9 =
a 1 - 2a a
x y z
y z x
z x y
Note that we are still assuming:
u. =
a b 1 - a - b
x y z
y z x
z x y
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F (u.) = y (A17)
1.II.2.2.1 Suppose that:
F (u9) 6= y (A19)
Case 1.II.2.2.1.1 0 ≤ 1− 2a− b < ε
But then, voters in profile u9 with preferences

yz
x

 will misreport as

zx
y

 with
a coalition size of 1 − 2a− b. This will induce profile u. and evaluation (A17), for
improved outcome y. This would contradict WSP, so this case fails to hold.
Case 1.II.2.2.1.n+1 nε ≤ 1− 2a− b < (n+ 1)ε
Consider the following profile:
u(j) =
a 1 - 2a - jk a + jk
x y z
y z x
z x y
(Here, k = 1−2a−b
n+1 , and j iterates from 1 to n. Again, we note that this definition
of u(j) is local to this case).
Suppose that F (u(1)) = y. But then, voters in profile u9 with preferences

yz
x


will misreport as

zx
y

 with a coalition size of k < ε. This will induce profile u(1),
for improved outcome y. This would contradict WSP, meaning that F (u(1)) 6= y.
Now, we assume that F (u(j)) 6= y for some general j. We can show that
F (u(j+1)) 6= y as well. Suppose instead that F (u(j+1)) = y. But then, voters
in profile u(j) with preferences

yz
x

 will misreport as

zx
y

 with a coalition size
of k < ε. This will induce profile u(j+1), for improved outcome y. This would
contradict WSP, meaning that F (u(j+1)) 6= y.
This is true for the following profile:
u(n) =
a 1 - 2a - nk a + nk
x y z
y z x
z x y
=
a b + k 1 - a - b - k
x y z
y z x
z x y
But then, note that voters in profile u(n) with preferences

yz
x

 will misreport
as

zx
y

 with a coalition size of k < ε. This would induce profile u. and evaluation
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(A17), for improved result y. This would contradict WSP, meaning that this case
cannot hold.
1.II.2.2.2 So instead, it must be true that:
F (u9) = y (A20)
Apply permutation σ to profile u9 (where σ(x) = z, σ(y) = x, σ(z) = y), which,
by N and A, gives us:
u10 =
1 - 2a a a
x y z
y z x
z x y
F (u10) = x (A21)
Case 1.II.2.2.2.1 0 ≤ 3a− 1 < ε
Note that voters in profile u9 with preferences

xy
z

 will misreport as

yz
x

 with
a coalition weight of 3a− 1 < ε. This will induce profile u10, and achieve improved
outcome x. This would contradict WSP, meaning that Case 1.II.2.2.2.1 cannot
hold.
Case 1.II.2.2.2.n+1 nε ≤ 3a− 1 < (n+ 1)ε
Now, consider the following profile:
u(j) =
1 - 2a + jk a - jk a
x y z
y z x
z x y
(Here, k = 3a−1
n+1 , and j iterates from 1 to n. Also note that the definition of u
(j)
is local to this case).
Suppose that F (u(1)) 6= x. But then, voters in profile u(1) with preferences

xy
z


will misreport as

yz
x

 with a coalition weight of k < ε. This will induce profile
u10, and achieve improved outcome x. This would contradict WSP, meaning that
F (u(1)) = x.
Now, assume that for some general j that F (u(j)) = x. We can show that
F (u(j+1)) = x. Suppose instead that F (u(j+1)) 6= x. But then, voters in profile
u(j+1) with preferences

xy
z

 would misreport as

yz
x

 with a coalition weight of
k < ε. This would induce profile u(j), and result in improved outcome x, which
would contradict WSP. So, F (u(j+1)) = x.
In particular, this is true for the following profile:
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u(n) =
1 - 2a + nk a - nk a
x y z
y z x
z x y
=
a - k 1 - 2a + k a
x y z
y z x
z x y
But then, voters in profile u9 with preferences

xy
z

 will misreport as

yz
x

 with
a coalition weight of k < ε. This will induce profile u(n), giving improved result x,
and would violate WSP.
But this means that Case II is impossible. We have shown that there is no
voting rule that differs from the Borda Count which satisfies the properties P, A,
N, and WSP on the Condorcet Cycle domain. This concludes Step 1.
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Step 2
Now, we want to show that there is no voting rule that satisfies the axioms P,
A, N, and WSP on any expansion of the Condorcet cycle domain; by symmetry, it
suffices to show that there is no voting rule on:
U∗ =
{ x y z x
y z x z
z x y y
}
Proceed by contradiction. Assume that F is a voting rule that satisfies the
properties. Without loss of generality, we assume 23 > ε > 0.
We know that on the Condorcet domain, the only voting rule that satisfies P,
A, N, and WSP is the Borda Count. So, this tells us how F must behave on the
following profile:
u1 =
(1/3) - d (1/3) + 2d (1/3) - d
x y z
y z x
z x y
F (u1) = y (E1)
Let 0 < d < 112 . We define d based on ε:
d =
ε
8
<
2
24
=
1
12
For this step, we will consider the following profile:
u2 =
(1/3) - d (1/3) + 2d (1/3) - d
x y x
z z z
y x y
We will show that F (u2) cannot be defined in a way that satisfies the properties
P, A, N, and WSP.
2.I Suppose that the profile u2 has the following evaluation.
F (u2) = x (E2)
We will show that this cannot be true for any d and ε, indexing by the interval
nε ≤ 23 − 2d < (n+1)ε for some integer n ≥ 0. Note that this exists for any choice
of 23 > ε > 0:
We want to display an n ∈ Z≥0 such that:
nε ≤
2
3
− 2d < (n+ 1)ε
We have set d = ε8 , so the inequality nε ≤
2
3 − 2d < (n+ 1)ε is equivalent to:
nε ≤
2
3
−
ε
4
< (n+ 1)ε
Set n =
⌊
2
3ε −
1
4
⌋
. Since ε > 0 then this n will always be finite.
Case 2.I.1 0 ≤ 23 − 2d < ε
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Then, voters in profile u1 with preferences

xy
z

 will misreport their preferences
as

xz
y

, and voters in profile u1 with preferences

zx
y

 will also misreport their
preferences as

xz
y

, inducing u2 and evaluation (E2), and improving their outcome
from y to x. This is a coalition size of 2(13 − d) < ε. This would contradict WSP,
meaning that the profile of u2 could not evaluate to x.
Case 2.I.2 ε ≤ 23 − 2d < 2ε
Now, for convenience, denote 13 − d as q. Recall that:
F (u1) = y
And, we are supposing that:
F (u2) = x
Consider the following profile:
u′ =
q (1/3) + 2d q
x y x
y z z
z x y
What can F (u′) evaluate to? Suppose that F (u′) 6= y. Then, in profile u1, those
with preferences

zx
y

 would misreport as

xz
y

 with coalition size q < ε, which
would improve their outcome from y. This would contradict WSP, so we conclude
that F (u′) = y.
But then (as an assumption for 2.I), we are assuming that F (u2) evaluates to x.
Given this, in u′, people with preferences

xy
z

 would misreport their preferences
as

xz
y

 (for a coalition of size q), inducing improved outcome x, and contradicting
WSP. In this case, it cannot be true that F (u2) evaluates to x.
Case 2.I.n+1 nε ≤ 2q < (n+ 1)ε (for n ≥ 2)
Again, recall that:
F (u1) = y
We are supposing that:
F (u2) = x
Let r =
⌈
n+1
2
⌉
. Note that r ≥ n+12 .
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Consider the set of profiles:
u(j) =
q (1/3) + 2d (r - j)(q/r) j(q/r)
x y z x
y z x z
z x y y
(where integer j iterates from 0 to r − 1)
Note that when j = 0, we have:
u(0) =
q (1/3) + 2d q
x y z
y z x
z x y
This profile is exactly equivalent to u1, meaning that F (u
(0)) = y.
Then, consider
u(1) =
q (1/3) + 2d (r - 1)(q/r) (q/r)
x y z x
y z x z
z x y y
If F (u(1)) 6= y, then in profile u(0), those with preferences

zx
y

 would form a
coalition of size q
r
(as q
r
≤
2( 1
3
−d)
n+1 < ε) and misreport as

xz
y

, creating profile u(1),
and inducing an outcome that is better than y for them. This would contradict
WSP , so F (u(1)) = y.
Now, assume that for some general 0 < j < r−1, F (u(j)) = y. We want to show
that F (u(j+1)) = y.
So, we have:
u(j) =
q (1/3) + 2d (r - j)(q/r) j(q/r)
x y z x
y z x z
z x y y
u(j+1) =
q (1/3) + 2d (r - j - 1)(q/r) (j + 1)(q/r)
x y z x
y z x z
z x y y
Suppose that F (u(j+1)) 6= y. But then, voters in u(j) with preferences

zx
y


would form a coalition of size q
r
and misreport as

xz
y

, creating profile u(j+1), and
improving their outcome. This means that F (u(j+1)) = y.
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A similar logic applies for all j, so we have that F (u(j)) = y. In particular, we
have that:
F (u(r−1)) = F


q (1/3) + 2d (q/r) (r - 1)(q/r)
x y z x
y z x z
z x y y

 = y (E3)
From the other direction, consider the set of profiles:
u(k) =
k(q/r) (1/3) + 2d (2r - k)(q/r)
x y x
y z z
z x y
(where integer k iterates from 0 to r).
Note that when k = 0, we have the following profile:
u(0) =
(1/3) + 2d 2q
y x
z z
x y
By the property A, this is equivalent to the profile u2. So, we have that F (u(0)) =
x.
Consider the next profile:
u(1) =
(q/r) (1/3) + 2d (2r - 1)(q/r)
x y x
y z z
z x y
Suppose that F (u(1)) 6= x. But then, those in profile u(1) with preferences

xy
z


would misreport as

xz
y

 (coalition size q
r
), inducing profile u(0) and improved
outcome x. So, F (u(1)) = x.
Again, this logic will apply for all k. Assume for some general k < r that
F (u(k)) = x. So then, we want to show that F (u(k+1)) = x.
u(k) =
k(q/r) (1/3) + 2d (2r - k)(q/r)
x y x
y z z
z x y
u(k+1) =
(k + 1)(q/r) (1/3) + 2d (2r - k - 1)(q/r)
x y x
y z z
z x y
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Suppose that F (u(k+1)) 6= x. But then, those in profile u(k+1) with preferences
xy
z

 would misreport as

xz
y

 (coalition size q
r
), inducing profile u(k) and improved
outcome x. So, F (u(k+1)) = x.
This means that in particular, we have:
F (u(r)) = F


q (1/3) + 2d q
x y x
y z z
z x y

 = x
Note that for the evaluation F (u(r−1)) in (E3) above, those with preferences
zx
y

 would misreport their preferences as

xz
y

 (with coalition size q
r
). This would
induce profile u(r) and outcome x, contradicting WSP. So, this case also fails.
This means that for any ε, for F to satisfy the properties P, A, N, and WSP, it
is impossible for F to evaluate as x on profile u2.
2.II Suppose that the profile u2 has the following evaluation.
F


(1/3) - d (1/3) + 2d (1/3) - d
x y x
z z z
y x y

 = y
By the property A, the profile u2 is equivalent to the following:
u′2 =
(2/3) - 2d (1/3) + 2d
x y
z z
y x
This means that the following evaluation is also true:
F (u′2) = y (E4)
Then, we apply the permutation σ∗, where σ∗(x) = y, σ∗(y) = x, σ∗(z) = z. By
A and N , we create the following profile and evaluation:
u3 =
(2/3) - 2d (1/3) + 2d
y x
z z
x y
F (u3) = x (E5)
Recall that in the setup for this step, we assumed that d < 112 . This is still the
case, as we have set d = ε8 . Therefore, (2/3)− 2d >
1
2 > (1/3) + 2d.
Additionally, there exists m ∈ Z≥0 such that mε ≤
1
3 − 4d < (m+ 1)ε. Because
ε < 23 , we can set m =
⌊
1
3ε −
1
2
⌋
. Since 0 < ε < 23 , then m will always be greater
than or equal to zero and finite.
For convenience, in the following steps, denote 23 − 2d as D, and
1
3 +2d as 1−D.
Also, note that 12 < D <
2
3 , and 2D − 1 =
1
3 − 4d.
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Case 2.II.1: 0 ≤ 13 − 4d < ε
In profile u3, voters with preferences

yz
x

 would form a coalition of size (2/3)−
2d− ((1/3) + 2d) = 13 − 4d = 2D − 1, and misrepresent their preferences as

xz
y

,
inducing (E4), and getting them improved outcome y. This would violate WSP. For
this case, to satisfy the properties the we want, it cannot be true that F (u2) = y.
Case 2.II.2: ε ≤ 13 − 4d < 2ε (i.e., ε ≤ 2D − 1 < 2ε)
Again, recall that we are assuming:
F (u′2) = y (E4)
And, from (E4) and the properties A, N, it follows that:
F (u3) = x (E5)
Consider the following profile:
u4 =
D - k (1 - D) + k
x y
z z
y x
(where k = 2D−12 , so k < ε. Also, note that in this case, D − k =
1
2 , and
(1−D) + k = 12 ).
We want to consider what F (u4) can evaluate to. Suppose that F (u4) 6= y.
But then, in profile u′2, voters with preferences

xz
y

 would form a coalition of size
k < ε, and misreport as

yz
x

, inducing u4 and an improved outcome over y. This
would contradict WSP, so, F (u4) = y.
But then, voters in profile u3 with preferences

yz
x

 would form a coalition of
size k < ε, and misreport as

xz
y

, inducing profile u4 and improved outcome y.
This would contradict WSP. So, again, for this case, to satisfy the properties the
we want, it cannot be true that F (u2) = y.
Case 2.II.m+1 mε ≤ 13 − 4d < (m+ 1)ε (for m ≥ 2)
Again, recall that we are assuming:
F (u′2) = y (E4)
And, from (E4) and the properties A, N, it follows that:
F (u3) = x (E5)
Now, consider the following profiles:
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u(j) =
D - jk′ (1 - D) + jk′
x y
z z
y x
(where j iterates from 1 to m, and k′ = 2D−1
m+1 . And, note that this definition of
u(j) is local to Case 2.II.m+1).
We first consider the evaluation of u(1). Suppose that F (u(1)) 6= y. But then,
in profile u′2, voters with preferences

xz
y

 would form a coalition of size k′, and
misreport as

yz
x

, inducing profile u(1) and an improved outcome over y. This
would contradict WSP, so, F (u(1)) = y.
For a general j, assume that F (u(j)) = y. By a similar logic to before, we can
show that F (u(j+1)) = y. Suppose that F (u(j+1)) 6= y. Then, in profile u(j), voters
with preferences

xz
y

 would form a coalition of size k′, and misreport as

yz
x

,
inducing profile u(j+1) and an improved outcome over y. This would contradict
WSP, so, F (u(j+1)) = y, for any j.
We have the following profile and evaluation:
u(m) =
D - mk′ (1 - D) + mk′
x y
z z
y x
F (u(m)) = y
But then, note that in profile u3, voters who have preferences

yz
x

 would form
a coalition of size k′, and misreport as

xz
y

, inducing profile u(m) and improved
outcome y.
Clearly, D − (1 −D +mk′) = 2D − 1−mk′ = (m+1)(2D−1)−m(2D−1)
m+1 = k
′ < ε.
This would contradict WSP. So, for a general 13 − 4d, then F will not satisfy the
properties. Thus, it is impossible for F to evaluate as y on u2.
2.III Finally, suppose that the profile u2 has the following evaluation.
F


(1/3) - d (1/3) + 2d (1/3) - d
x y x
z z z
y x y

 = z (E6)
Equivalently, by the property A,
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u′2 =
(2/3) - 2d (1/3) + 2d
x y
z z
y x
F (u′2) = z
Consider the profile:
u5 =
(2/3) - 2d (1/3) + 2d
x z
z x
y y
We can show that it must be true that:
F (u5) = z (E7)
2.III.0 (set up) - showing that F (u5) = z
We will use an iterative approach to show that F (u5) must equal z for any d and
ε. The cases will be based on the following inequality:
hε ≤
1
3
+ 2d < (h+ 1)ε
Note that there exists some integer h ≥ 0 where the weight 13 + 2d fulfills the
inequality. We have set d = ε8 , so we can let h =
⌊
1
3ε +
1
4
⌋
.
Case 2.III.0.1: 0 ≤ 13 + 2d < ε
So, suppose that F (u5) 6= z. Then, in profile u5, voters with preferences

zx
y


would form a coalition of size 13 + 2d and misreport as

yz
x

, inducing profile u′2
and improved outcome z. This would contradict WSP, so F (u5) = z.
Case 2.III.0.2: ε ≤ 13 + 2d < 2ε
Again, we proceed by contradiction, and suppose that F (u5) 6= z. Consider the
following profile:
u∗5 =
(2/3) - 2d c (1/3) + 2d - c
x z y
z x z
y y x
(Here, we let c =
1
3
+2d
2 )
So, what can F (u∗5) evaluate to? Suppose that F (u
∗
5) 6= z. But then, voters
in u∗5 with preferences

zx
y

 would form a coalition of size c < ε, and misreport
their preferences as

yz
x

, inducing profile u′2 and improved outcome z. This would
contradict WSP, so F (u∗5) = z.
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Suppose that F (u5) 6= z. But then, voters in u5 with preferences

zx
y

 would
form a coalition of size c < ε, and misreport their preferences as

yz
x

, inducing
profile u∗5 and improved outcome z. This would contradict WSP, so F (u5) = z.
Case 2.III.0.h+1: hε ≤ 13 + 2d < (h+ 1)ε (for h ≥ 2)
Consider the following profiles:
u
(j)
5 =
(2/3) - 2d jc′ (1/3) + 2d - jc′
x z y
z x z
y y x
(Here, c′ =
1
3
+2d
h+1 , and j iterates from 0 to h.)
When j = 0, then this profile is just equivalent to u′2. So, we know that F (u
(0)
5 ) =
z. Then, we want to know what the evaluation F (u
(1)
5 ) is. Suppose that F (u
(1)
5 ) 6=
z. But then, voters in u
(1)
5 with preferences

zx
y

 would form a coalition of size
c′ < ε, and misreport their preferences as

yz
x

, inducing profile u(0)5 and improved
outcome z. This would contradict WSP, so F (u
(1)
5 ) = z. A similar logic applies
for all j, so this means that F (u
(h)
5 ) = z. Assume that F (u
(j)
5 ) = z for some
general j. Then, we want to know what the evaluation F (u
(j+1)
5 ) is. Suppose that
F (u
(j+1)
5 ) 6= z. But then, voters in u
(j+1)
5 with preferences

zx
y

 would form a
coalition of size c′ < ε, and misreport their preferences as

yz
x

, inducing profile
u
(j)
5 and improved outcome z. This would contradict WSP, so F (u
(j+1)
5 ) = z.
But then this means that F (u5) must equal z: otherwise, if F (u5) 6= z, then
voters in profile u5 with preferences

zx
y

 would deviate with a coalition size of
c′, and misreport their preferences as

yz
x

, inducing profile u(h)5 and outcome z.
Therefore, F (u5) = z.
We have that F (u5) = z, and we see that is true for a general ε. This concludes
Step 2.III.0.
Apply the following permutation: σ∗∗(x) = z, σ∗∗(y) = y, σ∗∗(z) = x to u5.
With N and A, this gives us the following profile and evaluation:
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u6 =
(2/3) - 2d (1/3) + 2d
z x
x z
y y
F (u6) = x (E8)
As in 2.II, denote D = 23 − 2d, and set m as it was defined before.
Case 2.III.1 0 ≤ 2D − 1 < ε
In evaluation (E7) of profile u5, voters with preferences

xz
y

 would form a
coalition of size 2D−1, and misrepresent their preferences as

zx
y

, inducing profile
u6 and evaluation (E8), and achieving improved outcome x. This would violate
WSP, meaning that for this case, F (u2) 6= z.
Case 2.III.2 ε ≤ 2D − 1 < 2ε
Again, recall that we are assuming:
F (u′2) = z
We also have:
F (u5) = z (E7)
F (u6) = x (E8)
Consider the following profile:
u7 =
D - k (1 - D) + k
x z
z x
y y
(where k = 2D−12 , so k < ε. Again, note that in this case, D − k =
1
2 , and
(1−D) + k = 12 ).
We want to consider the evaluation F (u7). Suppose that F (u7) = x (also note
that y is Pareto dominated on this profile, and cannot be the result). But then,
in profile u5, voters with preferences

xz
y

 would form a coalition of size k, and
misreport as

zx
y

, inducing u7 and an improved outcome over z. This would
contradict WSP, so, F (u7) = z.
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But then, voters in profile u6 with preferences

zx
y

 would form a coalition of
size k, and misreport as

xz
y

, inducing profile u7 and improved outcome z. This
would contradictWSP. This means that F (u7) cannot equal z. But, this violates the
initial hypothesis that F (u2) = z. So, again, for this case, to satisfy the properties
that we want, it cannot be true that F (u2) = z.
Case 2.III.m+1 mε ≤ 2D − 1 < (m+ 1)ε (for m ≥ 2)
Again, recall that we are assuming:
F (u′2) = z
And, we have that:
F (u5) = z (E7)
F (u6) = x (E8)
Now, consider the following profiles:
u(j) =
D - jk′ (1 - D) + jk′
x z
z x
y y
(where j iterates from 1 to m, and k′ = 2D−1
m+1 . Also note that this definition of
u(j) is local to Case 2.III.m+1.)
First consider the evaluation when we have u(1). Suppose that F (u(1)) = x. But
then, in (E7), voters in profile u5 with preferences

xz
y

 would form a coalition of
size k′, and misreport as

zx
y

, inducing profile u(1) and an improved outcome x.
This would contradict WSP, so, F (u(1)) = z.
For a general j, assume that F (u(j)) = z. By a similar logic to before, we
can show that F (u(j+1)) = z. Suppose that F (u(j+1)) = x. So then in profile
u(j), voters with preferences

xz
y

 would form a coalition of size k′, and misreport
as

zx
y

, inducing profile u(j+1) and an improved outcome x over z. This would
contradict WSP, so, F (u(j+1)) = z, for any j.
This gives us the following profile and evaluation:
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u(m) =
D - mk′ (1 - D) + mk′
x z
z x
y y
F (u(m)) = z
But then, note that in profile u6, the voters with preferences

zx
y

 would form
a coalition of size k′, and misreport as

xz
y

, inducing profile u(m) and improved
outcome z. Again, the coalition size is less than ε, as in 2.II.m+1.
This would contradict WSP. This in turn contradicts the original hypothesis that
F (u2) = z.
This concludes Step 2. We see that for a general ε, knowing that F (u1) = y,
then there is nothing that F can evaluate to on u2. This means that there is no
voting rule F that satisfies the properties P, A, N, and WSP on an expansion of
the Condorcet domain.
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Step 3
We first consider the following rich domain:
U I =
{
x y y z
y z x y
z x z x
}
Consider the voting rule F satisfying P, A, N, and WSP on U I . We want to
show that there is no voting rule F 6= FC that satisfies these axioms. Fix ε > 0.
Consider the generic profile:
uI. =
a b c 1 - a - b - c
x y y z
y z x y
z x z x
(Note that the profiles and weights here have no relation to the weights and
profiles that were named in previous steps).
3.I.1 Suppose that the result of Condorcet FC(uI. ) is x. So, a >
1
2 .
3.I.1.1 Suppose that:
F (uI. ) = y (I1)
Consider the following profile:
uI1 =
a 1 - a
x y
y x
z z
3.I.1.1.0 We want to show that:
F (uI1) = y
Assume that a is fixed, and the conditions for the following cases are based on c
(and implicitly on b).
Case 3.I.1.1.0.1: 0 ≤ 1− a− c < ε
If F (uI1) was not y, then those in profile u
I
1 with preferences

yx
z

 would form
a coalition of size 1 − a− c, where a weight of b would misrepresent as

yz
x

, and
a weight of 1 − a − b − c would misrepresent as

zy
x

, inducing profile uI. and
evaluation (I1), leading to improved result y. This would contradict WSP. So,
when 1− a− c < ε, F (uI1) = y.
Case 3.I.1.1.0.2: ε ≤ 1− a− c < 2ε
Again, by assumption for this step, we are supposing that:
F (uI. ) = y (I1)
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Consider the following profile:
uI2 =
a k 1 - a - k - m m
x y y z
y z x y
z x z x
(Here, k = b2 ;m =
1−a−b−c
2 ).
Suppose that F (uI2) 6= y.
Then, people with preferences

yx
z

 in uI2 would want to induce initial profile
uI. . So, a group of size b − k would misrepresent their preferences as

yz
x

, and a
group of size 1− a− b− c−m would misrepresent their preferences as

zy
x

. This
would create profile uI. , and improved outcome y. Note that the coalition size is
less than ε:
b− k + 1− a− b− c−m =
1− a− c
2
< ε
So, to satisfy WSP, this tells us that F (uI2) = y.
Consider renaming the weights on uI2 in the following manner.
Where:
a∗ = a; b∗ = k; c∗ = 1− a− k −m; 1− a∗ − b∗ − c∗ = m.
uI2 =
a∗ b∗ c∗ 1− a∗ − b∗ − c∗
x y y z
y z x y
z x z x
This is still the same profile but with different labels on the weights. We see
that b∗ + 1− a∗ − b∗ − c∗ = k+m < ε. So, knowing the F (uI2) = y, we see that u
I
2
is just an instance of Case 3.I.1.1.0.1. This tells us that F (uI1) = y.
Now, for the inductive hypothesis, we assume that all cases up toCase 3.I.1.1.0.n
hold. In other words, given some profile:
u∗ =
a b∗ c∗ 1− a− b∗ − c∗
x y y z
y z x y
z x z x
where the following conditions are true:
F (u∗) = y
(n− 1)ε ≤ 1− a− c∗ < nε (W1)
Then this implies that F (uI1) = y.
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Now, we consider the following case:
Case 3.I.1.1.0.n+1: nε ≤ 1− a− c < (n+ 1)ε
We are still supposing that:
F (uI. ) = y (I1)
Consider the following profile:
uI(n) =
a k′ 1 - a - k′ - m′ m′
x y y z
y z x y
z x z x
(Here, k′ = nb
n+1 , m
′ = n(1−a−b−c)
n+1 ).
We consider the result F (uI(n)). Suppose that F (u
I
(n)) 6= y. But then, voters
with preferences

yx
z

 in uI(n) would want to induce initial profile uI. . A weight of
b− k′ would misreport as

yz
x

 and a weight of 1− a− b− c−m′ would misreport
their preferences as

zy
x

. This would create profile uI. and improved result y,
contradicting WSP. So, this tells us that F (uI(n)) = y.
But then, note that the weights on profile uI(n) fulfill the following:
F (uI(n)) = y
(n− 1)ε ≤ k′ +m′ =
n(1− a− c)
n+ 1
< nε
So, this we see that profile uI(n) is a case of a profile u
∗ that satisfies a case of
3.I.1.1.0.n, where b∗ = k′, c∗ = 1 − a − k′ − m′, 1 − a − b∗ − c∗ = m′. By the
inductive hypothesis, this tells us that:
F (uI1) = y
This is true in general. This tells us that for any a > 12 , and for any c that
satisfies 1− a− c > 0, if the winner of F on uI. is y, then it also follows that:
F


a 1 - a
x y
y x
z z

 = y (I2)
3.I.1.1.1 Now, we will show that a voting rule F 6= FC that satisfies the axioms,
where F (uI1) = y, is impossible.
Apply permutation σ∗ to profile uI1, where σ
∗(x) = y, σ∗(y) = x, and σ∗(z) = z.
This gives us the following profile and evaluation:
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uI3 =
a 1 - a
y x
x y
z z
F (uI3) = x (I3)
Case 3.I.1.1.1.1 0 ≤ |2a− 1| < ε
If a− (1− a) < ε, then voters in profile uI3 with preferences

yx
z

 would form a
coalition of size 2a− 1, and misreport their preferences as

xy
z

. This would create
profile uI1 and evaluation (I2), giving improved result y.
This would contradict WSP, meaning that on this range of a and b, our original
hypothesis that F 6= FC cannot be true. So, this tells us that when a∗ fulfills the
following inequality, then F must agree with FC :
1
2
< a∗ <
1
2
+
ε
2
(W2)
Then:
F


a∗ 1− a∗
x y
y x
z z

 = x
Case 3.I.1.1.1.2 ε ≤ |2a− 1| < 2ε (i.e., ε2 +
1
2 < a ≤ ε+
1
2 )
Note that a = 12 + ε− δ for some 0 < δ ≤
ε
2 .
Again, we have:
F (uI1) = y (I2)
Now, consider the following profile:
uI4 =
a - k 1 - a + k
x y
y x
z z
Where:
k =
a− 12
2
=
ε− δ
2
< ε
Note that a− k = 12 +
ε
2 −
δ
2 <
1
2 +
ε
2
Additionally, note that:
δ
2
<
ε
4
ε
4
−
δ
2
> 0
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The weight on preferences

xy
z

 in profile uI4 also satisfies the following inequal-
ity:
a− k =
1
2
+
ε
2
−
δ
2
=
1
2
+
ε
4
+
ε
4
−
δ
2
>
1
2
+
ε
4
This means that:
1
2
< a− k <
1
2
+
ε
2
So, this weight is within the range where F = FC from Case 3.I.1.1.1.1. So,
F (uI4) = x.
But then, note that voters in profile uI1 with preferences

xy
z

 would misreport
as

yx
z

 to induce profile uI4 and improved result x. This again would contradict
WSP, meaning that on this range of (a, b), we have that F = FC .
A similar logic will hold for all a > 12 . So, in general, we see that our assumption
for the evaluation F (uI. ) in 3.I.1.1 fails to hold, and we move on to 3.I.1.2.
3.I.1.2 Now we suppose that:
F (uI. ) = z (I4)
As before, we have:
uI. =
a b c 1 - a - b - c
x y y z
y z x y
z x z x
Consider the following profile:
uI4 =
a 1 - a
x z
y y
z x
3.I.1.2.0 Now we want to show that:
F (uI4) = z
Assume that a is fixed, and the conditions for the following cases are based on b
and c.
Case 3.I.1.2.0.1: 0 ≤ b+ c < ε
We consider the evaluation of F (uI4). By supposition, we have:
F (uI. ) = z (I4)
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Suppose that F (uI4) 6= z. But then, voters in profile u
I
4 with preferences

zy
x


would want to induce outcome z and evaluation (I4). So, they would deviate, and
misreport

yz
x

 with weight b, and misreport

yx
z

 with weight c, forming profile
uI. , and result z. So, this would improve their result, contradicting WSP. For this
case, we have that F (uI4) = z.
Case 3.I.1.2.0.2: ε ≤ b+ c < 2ε
We are still assuming that:
F (uI. ) = z (I4)
Consider the following profile:
uI5 =
a k m 1 - a - k - m
x y y z
y z x y
z x z x
Let k = b2 , and m =
c
2 . Note that the definitions of k and m are local to this
case.
Suppose that F (uI5) 6= z. But then, voters in profile (u
I
5) with preferences

zy
x


would want to induce evaluation (I4) and outcome z. They would deviate, and
misreport

yz
x

 with weight b − k, and misreport

yx
z

 with weight c −m. This
would create profile uI. and evaluation (I4), inducing outcome z. So, this would
improve their result, contradicting WSP. This tells us that F (uI5) = z.
But then, we consider the following relabeling of the weights in profile uI5:
a = a; b′ = k; c′ = m; 1− a′ − b′ − c′ = 1− a− k −m
Note that b′ + c′ < ε. We have shown that it must be true that F (uI5) = z. So,
profile uI5 is just a case of 3.I.1.2.0.1, meaning that:
F (uI4) = z
For the inductive hypothesis, we assume that all cases up to and including Case
3.I.1.2.0.n hold. So, in other words, given some profile:
u∗ =
a b∗ c∗ 1− a− b∗ − c∗
x y y z
y z x y
z x z x
where:
F (u∗) = z
and the following inequality holds:
51
(n− 1)ε ≤ b∗ + c∗ < nε (W3)
then, it is also true that
F (uI4) = z
Case 3.I.1.2.0.n+1 nε ≤ b+ c < (n+ 1)ε
Again we have:
F (uI. ) = z (I4)
We want to show:
F (uI4) = z
Consider the following profile:
uI(n) =
a k m 1 - a - k - m
x y y z
y z x y
z x z x
Here, we let k = nb
n+1 , and m =
nc
n+1 . Also note that this definition of u
I
(n) is
local to this case.
Suppose that F (uI(n)) 6= z. But then, voters with preferences

zy
x

 would want
to induce profile uI. and outcome z.
Voters in profile uI(n) with preferences

zy
x

 would deviate, and misreport

yz
x


with weight b−k, and misreport

yx
z

 with weight c−m. This would be a coalition
of size b+c
n+1 < ε. So, this would create profile u
I
. and evaluation (I4), inducing
outcome z. This would result in an improved outcome for the

zy
x

 coalition, and
would contradict WSP. So, F (uI(n)) = z.
Then, note that the weights in profile uI(n) fulfill inequality (W3):
(n− 1)ε ≤
n(b+ c)
n+ 1
< nε
So, profile uI(n) reduces to a profile u
∗ that satisfies Case 3.I.1.2.0.n (where
b∗ = k and c∗ = m). This implies that F (uI4) = z. This is true in general.
F (uI4) = z (I5)
3.I.1.2.1 Now, we will show that a voting rule F 6= FC that satisfies the axioms,
where F (uI4) = z, is impossible.
Apply permutation σ∗∗ to uI4, where σ
∗∗(x) = z, σ∗∗(z) = x, σ∗∗(y) = y.
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uI4 =
a 1 - a
x z
y y
z x
F (uI4) = z (I6)
uI5 =
a 1 - a
z x
y y
x z
=
1 - a a
x z
y y
z x
By A and N, we have:
F (uI5) = x (I7)
Case 3.I.1.2.1.1 0 ≤ |2a− 1| < ε
If a− (1− a) < ε, then voters in profile uI4 with preferences

xy
z

 would form a
coalition of size 2a− 1, and misreport their preferences as

zy
x

. This would create
profile uI5 and evaluation (I6), giving improved result x. This would contradict
WSP, meaning that Case 3.I.1.2.1.1 fails to hold.
Case 3.I.1.2.1.n+1 nε ≤ |2a− 1| < (n+ 1)ε
Again, we have:
F (uI4) = z (I6)
F (uI5) = x (I6)
Now, consider the following profile:
uI(j) =
a - jk 1 - a + jk
x z
y y
z x
Here, j iterates from 1 to n, and k = 2a−1
n+1 . Note that the definition of u
I
(j) is
local to this case.
We first consider the evaluation F (uI(1)). Suppose that F (u
I
(1)) 6= z. But then,
voters in profile uI4 with preferences

xy
z

 would form a coalition of size k, and
misreport their preferences as

zy
x

. This would induce profile uI(1) and an improved
result over z, contradicting WSP. So, we have that F (uI(1)) = z.
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Now, assume for a general j that F (uI(j)) = z. We can show that F (u
I
(j+1)) = z.
Suppose instead that F (uI(j+1)) 6= z. But then, voters in profile u
I
(j) with preferences
xy
z

 would form a coalition of size k, and misreport their preferences as

zy
x

. This
would induce profile uI(j+1) and an improved result over z, contradicting WSP. So,
in general, F (uI(j+1)) = z. In particular, this is true for the following profile:
uI(n) =
a - nk 1 - a + nk
x z
y y
z x
=
1 - a + k a - k
x z
y y
z x
But then, note that voters in profile uI(n) with preferences

xy
z

 would form a
coalition of size k, and misreport their preferences as

zy
x

. This would induce
profile uI5, and improved result x over z, contradicting WSP. This case fails to hold.
This concludes 3.I.1.2 and 3.I.1. We next consider 3.I.2.
3.I.2 Suppose that the result of Condorcet FC(uI. ) is y. So, a <
1
2 , and a+b+c >
1
2 .
3.I.2.1 Suppose that:
F (uI. ) = x (I8)
Consider the following profile:
uI6 =
a b + c 1 - a - b - c
x y z
y x y
z z x
3.I.2.1.1 Suppose that
F (uI6) = y (I9)
Case 3.I.2.1.1.1 0 ≤ b < ε
But then, note that voters in profile uI. with preferences

yz
x

 will misreport as

yx
z

 with a coalition weight of b < ε. This would induce profile uI6 and improved
outcome y, violating WSP. So, this fails to hold.
Case 3.I.2.1.1.n+1 nε ≤ b < (n+ 1)ε
We are assuming that:
F (uI6) = y (I9)
Now, consider the following profiles:
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uI(j) =
a jk b + c - jk 1 - a - b - c
x y y z
y z x y
z x z x
Here, j iterates from 1 to n, and k = b
n+1 . Also note that this definition of u
I
(j)
is local to this case.
Suppose that F (uI(1)) 6= y. But then, voters in profile u
I
(1) with preferences

yz
x


will misreport as

yx
z

 with a coalition weight of k < ε. This would induce profile
uI6 and improved outcome y, violating WSP. So, F (u
I
(1)) = y.
Now, assume for a general j that F (uI(j)) = y. We can show that F (u
I
(j+1)) =
y. Suppose instead that F (uI(j+1)) 6= y. But then, voters in profile u
I
(j+1) with
preferences

yz
x

 will misreport as

yx
z

 with a coalition weight of k < ε. This
would induce profile uI(j) and improved outcome y, violating WSP. So, F (u
I
(j+1)) =
y.
In particular, this is true for:
uI(n) =
a nk b + c - nk 1 - a - b - c
x y y z
y z x y
z x z x
=
a b - k b + c + k 1 - a - b - c
x y y z
y z x y
z x z x
So, voters in profile uI. with preferences

yz
x

 will misreport as

yx
z

 with a
coalition weight of k < ε. This would induce profile uI(n) and improved outcome y,
violating WSP. So, this case fails to hold.
3.I.2.1.2 Next, suppose that
F (uI6) = z (I10)
Case 3.I.2.1.2.1 0 ≤ b < ε
But then, voters in profile uI6 with preferences

yx
z

 will misreport as

yz
x


with a weight of b < ε. This will induce profile uI. and evaluation (I8), achieving
improved result x over z. This would contradict WSP, so this case fails to hold.
Case 3.I.2.1.2.n+1 nε ≤ b < (n+ 1)ε
By assumption for this step, we have:
F (uI. ) = x (I8)
F (uI6) = z (I10)
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Consider the following profile:
uI(j) =
a jk b + c - jk 1 - a - b - c
x y y z
y z x y
z x z x
Here, j iterates from 1 to n, and k = b
n+1 . Note that the definition of u
I
(j) is
local to this case.
Suppose that F (uI(1)) 6= z. But then, note that voters in profile u
I
6 with prefer-
ences

yx
z

 will misreport as

yz
x

 with a weight of k < ε. This will induce profile
uI(1) and an improved result over z, contradicting WSP. So, F (u
I
(1)) = z.
Now, assume for a general j that F (uI(j)) = z. We can likewise show that
F (uI(j+1)) = z. Suppose instead that F (u
I
(j+1)) 6= z. But then, voters in profile
uI(j) with preferences

yx
z

 will misreport as

yz
x

 with a weight of k < ε. This
will induce profile uI(j+1) and an improved result over z, contradicting WSP. So, in
general, F (uI(j+1)) = z.
In particular, this is true for the following profile:
uI(n) =
a nk b + c - nk 1 - a - b - c
x y y z
y z x y
z x z x
=
a b - k c + k 1 - a - b - c
x y y z
y z x y
z x z x
But then, note that voters in profile uI(n) with preferences

yx
z

 will misreport
as

yz
x

 with a weight of k < ε. This will induce profile uI. and evaluation (I8), for
improved result x over z, contradicting WSP. So, this case fails to hold.
3.I.2.1.3 So, instead, it must be the case that
F (uI6) = x (I11)
Now, we consider the following profile:
uI7 =
a 1 - a
x y
y x
z z
Note that z is Pareto dominated here, so cannot be the result of the evaluation
F (uI7).
3.I.2.1.3.1 Suppose that
F (uI7) = y (I12)
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Case 3.I.2.1.3.1.1 0 ≤ 1− a− b− c < ε
In this case, voters in profile uI6 with preferences

zy
x

 will misreport as

yx
z


with a weight of 1−a− b− c < ε. This would induce profile uI7 and improved result
y over x, contradicting WSP. So, Case 3.I.2.1.3.1.1 fails to hold.
Case 3.I.2.1.3.1.n+1 nε ≤ 1− a− b− c < (n+ 1)ε
Again, for 3.I.2.1.3, we have that:
F (uI6) = x (I11)
We are assuming that:
F (uI7) = y (I12)
Now, consider the following profile:
uI(j) =
a b + c +jk 1 - a - b - c - jk
x y z
y x y
z z x
Here, j iterates from 1 to n, and k = 1−a−b−c
n+1 . Note that this definition of u
I
(j)
is local to this case.
We first consider uI(1). Suppose that F (u
I
(1)) 6= x. But then, voters in profile u
I
6
with preferences

zy
x

 will misreport as

yx
z

 with a weight of k < ε. This would
induce profile uI(1) and an improvement over x, contradicting WSP. So, F (u
I
(1)) = x.
Now, assume that for some j that F (uI(j)) = x. We can show that F (u
I
(j+1)) = x.
Suppose instead that F (uI(j+1)) 6= x. But then, note that voters in profile u
I
(j)
with preferences

zy
x

 will misreport as

yx
z

 with a weight of k < ε. This would
induce profile uI(j+1) and an improvement over x, contradicting WSP. So, in general,
F (uI(j+1)) = x.
This is true in particular for the following profile:
uI(n) =
a b + c +nk 1 - a - b - c - nk
x y z
y x y
z z x
=
a 1 - a - k k
x y z
y x y
z z x
But then, note that voters in profile uI(n) with preferences

zy
x

 will misreport
as

yx
z

 with a weight of k < ε. This will induce profile uI7, achieving improved
outcome y over x, contradicting WSP. So, 3.I.2.1.3.1 fails to hold.
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3.I.2.1.3.2 Instead, it must be true that
F (uI7) = x (I13)
Recall that:
uI7 =
a 1 - a
x y
y x
z z
By assumption for 3.I.2, the Condorcet winner FC(uI. ) = y, implying that
a < 12 , and 1− a >
1
2 .
Consider the following relabeling of the weights on profile uI7, and apply permu-
tation σ∗, where σ∗(x) = y, σ∗(y) = x, and σ∗(z) = z.
uI7 =
A 1 - A
y x
x y
z z
F (uI7) = x (I13)
(Here, A = 1− a > 12 ).
uI8 =
A 1 - A
x y
y x
z z
By N and A:
F (uI8) = y (I13)
Now, note that we can derive a similar contradiction to WSP as we did in
3.I.1.1.1. So, this case fails to hold.
3.I.2.2 Suppose that F (uI. ) = z. But, note the symmetry between x and z,
meaning that the impossibility of 3.I.2.1 also implies the impossibility of 3.I.2.2.
3.I.3 Suppose that the result of Condorcet FC(uI. ) is z. But, we note that x
and z are symmetric in this domain, meaning that this case has been ruled out by
consideration of 3.I.1. So, we move on to the next domain.
STEP 3, Domain II (3.II)
Consider the next following rich domain:
U II =
{
x y y
y z x
z x z
}
Now we assume that F is some voting rule that satisfies P, A, N, and WSP on
U II . We want to show that F must equal FC . So, we proceed by contradiction.
Fix ε > 0, and fix a.
We consider the following generic profile, where F (uII. ) 6= F
C(uII. ).
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uII. =
a b 1 - a - b
x y y
y z x
z x z
We see that z is Pareto-dominated by y - so, the result of voting rules F and FC
on uI. cannot be z.
3.II.1 Suppose that the Condorcet winner FC(uII. ) = x.
This means that a > 12 by definition of the Condorcet method. As we are
assuming that F 6= FC , we have that:
F (uII. ) = y (I14)
Consider the following profile:
uII1 =
a 1 - a
x y
y x
z z
3.II.1.0 We want to show that for a general b, F (uII1 ) = y.
Case 3.II.1.0.1 0 ≤ b < ε
Suppose that F (uII1 ) = x. But then, voters in profile u
II
1 with preferences

yx
z


would misreport as

yz
x

 with a coalition size of b < ε. This would induce profile
uII. and evaluation (I14), and would yield improved result y, contradicting WSP.
So, for this case, it must be true that F (uII1 ) = x.
Case 3.II.1.0.2 ε ≤ b < 2ε
By assumption for 3.II.1, we have that:
F (uII. ) = y (I14)
Now, consider the following profile:
uII2 =
a b - k 1 - a - b + k
x y y
y z x
z x z
Here, k = b2 .
For F to satisfy WSP, then F (uII2 ) = y. Suppose instead that F (u
II
2 ) = x. But
then, voters in profile uII2 with preferences

yx
z

 would form a coalition of size
k < ε, and misreport their preferences as

yz
x

. This would induce profile uII. and
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evaluation (I14), achieving improved outcome y, contradicting WSP. So, we know
that F (uII2 ) = y.
Also note that:
uII2 =
a b - k 1 - a - b + k
x y y
y z x
z x z
=
a k 1 - a - k
x y y
y z x
z x z
This will imply that F (uII1 ) = y. Suppose instead that F (u
II
1 ) = x. But then,
voters in profile uII1 with preferences

yx
z

 would form a coalition of size k < ε, and
misreport their preferences as

yz
x

. This would induce profile uII2 and improved
result y, contradicting WSP. So, we have for this case that F (uII1 ) = x.
We can also see that F (uII1 ) = y by applying 3.II.1.0.1. Note that k < ε. So,
profile uII2 is just a case of the profiles that we considered in Case 3.II.1.0.1 to
show that F (uII1 ) = y. Because we have shown that F (u
II
2 ) = y, then this in turn
implies that F (uII1 ) = y.
Now, for the inductive hypothesis, we assume that all cases up toCase 3.II.1.0.n
hold. In other words, given some profile:
u∗ =
a b∗ 1− a− b∗
x y y
y z x
z x z
where the following conditions are true:
F (u∗) = y
(n− 1)ε ≤ b∗ < nε (W6)
then this implies that F (uII1 ) = y.
Now, we consider the following case:
Case 3.II.1.0.n+1 nε ≤ b < (n+ 1)ε
Again, by assumption for 3.II.1, we have that:
F (uII. ) = y (I14)
Now, consider the following profile:
uIIk =
a b - k 1 - a - b + k
x y y
y z x
z x z
(Here, k = b
n+1 . Note that this definition of k is local to this step).
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Suppose that F (uIIk ) = x. But then, voters in profile u
II
k with preferences

yx
z


would form a coalition of size k < ε, and misreport their preferences as

yz
x

. This
would induce profile uII. and evaluation (I14), resulting in improved outcome y.
This would contradict WSP, meaning that F (uIIk ) = y.
But then, consider the weights in profile uIIk . Note that:
b− k =
nb
n+ 1
And:
(n− 1)ε ≤
nb
n+ 1
< nε
These weights fulfill inequality (W6). So, given that F (uIIk ) = y, by the inductive
hypothesis, we can conclude that in this case, F (uII1 ) = y, as we wanted. Thus, in
general, for F to satisfy WSP, it must be true that:
F (uII1 ) = y (I15)
3.II.1.1 Now, we will show that evaluation (I15) results in a violation of WSP.
Apply permutation σ∗ to profile uII1 , where σ
∗(x) = y, σ∗(y) = x, and σ∗(z) = z.
This gives us the following profile and evaluation:
uII3 =
a 1 - a
y x
x y
z z
F (uII3 ) = x (I16)
Case 3.II.1.1.1 0 ≤ |2a− 1| < ε
If a− (1− a) < ε, then voters in profile uII3 with preferences

yx
z

 would form a
coalition of size 2a− 1, and misreport their preferences as

xy
z

. This would create
profile uII1 and evaluation (I15), giving improved result y.
This would contradict WSP, meaning that on this range of a and b, our original
hypothesis that F 6= FC cannot be true. So, this tells us that when a∗ fulfills the
inequality, F agrees with FC :
1
2
< a∗ <
1
2
+
ε
2
(W7)
Then:
F


a∗ 1− a∗
x y
y x
z z

 = x
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Case 3.II.1.1.2 ε ≤ |2a− 1| < 2ε (i.e., ε2 +
1
2 < a ≤ ε+
1
2 )
Note that a = 12 + ε− δ for some 0 < δ ≤
ε
2 .
Again, we have:
F (uII1 ) = y (I15)
Now, consider the following profile:
uII4 =
a - k 1 - a + k
x y
y x
z z
Where:
k =
a− 12
2
=
ε− δ
2
< ε
Note that a− k = 12 +
ε
2 −
δ
2 <
1
2 +
ε
2
Additionally, note that:
δ
2
<
ε
4
ε
4
−
δ
2
> 0
So, for the weight on preferences

xy
z

 in profile uII4 :
a− k =
1
2
+
ε
2
−
δ
2
=
1
2
+
ε
4
+
ε
4
−
δ
2
>
1
2
+
ε
4
This means that:
1
2
< a− k <
1
2
+
ε
2
So, this weight is within the range (W7) where F = FC from Case 3.II.1.1.1.
So, F (uII4 ) = x.
But then, note that voters in profile uII1 with preferences

xy
z

 would misreport
as

yx
z

 with a weight of k to induce profile uII4 and improved result x. This would
contradict WSP, meaning that on this range of (a, b), F = FC .
In other words, for a profile, where:
1
2
< a∗ <
1
2
+ ε
We can say that:
F


a∗ 1− a∗
x z
y y
z x

 = x
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A similar logic will apply for all a > 12 . So, we see that for 3.II.1, there is no
voting rule F 6= FC that satisfies the properties that we want.
3.II.2 Now suppose that the Condorcet winner FC(uII. ) = y.
This means that a < 12 .
We are assuming that F 6= FC , so, we have that:
F (uII. ) = x (I17)
Consider the profile:
uII5 =
a 1 - a
x y
y x
z z
We want to show that F (uII5 ) = x.
Case 3.II.2.1 0 ≤ b < ε
Assume that the following is true, and proceed by contradiction.
F


a 1 - a
x y
y x
z z

 = F (uII5 ) = y
Then, those with true preference ranking

yz
x

 in profile uII. would form a coali-
tion of size b < ε and misreport their true preferences as

yx
z

, which would form
profile uII5 , inducing result y, meaning that this would be a profitable deviation.
This contradicts WSP, and tells us for the case where b < ε, then F (uII5 ) = x.
Case 3.II.2.2 ε ≤ b < 2ε
Consider the profile:
uII6 =
a m 1 - a - m
x y y
y z x
z x z
(where m = b2 ).
Then, F (uII6 ) must equal x, because otherwise, from profile u
II
. , a coalition of
size b−m would deviate from

yz
x

 and misreport as

yx
z

 to form profile uII6 , and
achieve result y. This would contradict WSP (because the coalition size b−m < ε),
so F (uII6 ) = x. Also note that m < ε.
Then, we consider F (uII5 ). If F (u
II
5 ) = y, then all voters in u
II
6 with preferences
yz
x

 would misreport as

yx
z

 to form profile uII5 . So, this would contradict WSP,
meaning that F (uII6 ) = x.
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A similar logic applies for all subsequent b values. So, in general, for any a < 12
it must be true that:
F


a 1 - a
x y
y x
z z

 = x
If we rename 1− a and call it A, where A > 12 , then we have:
F


A 1 - A
y x
x y
z z

 = x
Then, we can apply the permutation σ∗, where σ∗(x) = y, σ∗(y) = x, σ∗(z) = z.
By N and A, we have:
F


A 1 - A
x y
y x
z z

 = y
This is the same pair of profiles that we had in 3.II.1, so the same results
follow, leading to a contradiction that tells us that F = FC . So, this shows that
for Domain II, there is no voting rule F other than the Condorcet method that
satisfies the axioms on this domain.
STEP 3, Domain III
We will now consider the final domain:
U III =
{
x x y y
y z z x
z y x z
}
Now we assume that F is some voting rule that satisfies the P, A, N, and WSP,
where F 6= FC .
So, F must differ from FC for some profile uIII. :
uIII. =
a b c 1 - a - b - c
x x y y
y z z x
z y x z
Note that the Condorcet winner on profile uIII. can never be z. Also note that
x and y are symmetric in the profile. So, we assume without loss of generality that
the Condorcet winner of uIII. is x. This means that:
a+ b > 1− a− b
3.III.1 Suppose that
F (uIII. ) = y (I18)
Consider the following profile:
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uIII1 =
a + b c 1 - a - b - c
x y y
y z x
z x z
3.III.1.1 Suppose that
F (uIII1 ) = x
Case 3.III.1.1.1 0 ≤ b < ε
In this case, voters in profile uIII. with preferences

xz
y

 will misreport as

xy
z


with a coalition size of b, inducing profile uIII1 and improved result x. This would
contradict WSP, so Case 3.III.1.1.1 fails to hold.
Case 3.III.1.1.n+1 nε ≤ b < (n+ 1)ε
Consider the following profile:
uIII(j) =
a + b - jk jk c 1 - a - b - c
x x y y
y z z x
z y x z
Here, k = b
n+1 , and j iterates from 1 to n. Note that the definition of u
III
(j) is
local to this case.
We first consider F (uIII(1) ). Suppose that F (u
III
(1) ) 6= x. But then, voters in profile
uIII(1) with preferences

xz
y

 will misreport as

xy
z

 with a coalition size of k < ε,
inducing profile uIII1 and improved result x. This would contradict WSP, so we
know that F (uIII(1) ) = x.
Now, assume for a general j that F (uIII(j) ) = x. We can show that it follows
that F (uIII(j+1)) = x. Suppose instead that F (u
III
(j+1)) 6= x. But then, voters in
profile uIII(j+1) with preferences

xz
y

 will misreport as

xy
z

 with a coalition size of
k < ε, inducing profile uIII(j) , and improved outcome x. This would contradict WSP,
meaning that F (uIII(j+1)) = x. This is true for any general j. In particular, this is
true for:
uIII(n) =
a + b - nk nk c 1 - a - b - c
x x y y
y z z x
z y x z
=
a + k b - k c 1 - a - b - c
x x y y
y z z x
z y x z
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But now, note that voters in profile uIII. with preferences

xz
y

 will misreport
as

xy
z

 with a coalition size of k, inducing profile uIII(n) and improved outcome x
over y. So, 3.III.1.1 fails to hold.
3.III.1.2 Now suppose that
F (uIII1 ) = z
Case 3.III.1.2.1
In this case, some voters in profile uIII1 with preferences

xy
z

 will misreport as

xz
y

 with a coalition size of b, inducing profile uIII. and evaluation (I18), giving
improved result y over z. This would contradict WSP, so Case 3.III.1.2.1 fails to
hold.
Case 3.III.1.2.n+1 nε ≤ b < (n+ 1)ε
Consider the following profile:
uIII(j) =
a + b - jk jk c 1 - a - b - c
x x y y
y z z x
z y x z
Here, k = b
n+1 , and j iterates from 1 to n. Note that the definition of u
III
(j) is
local to this case.
We first consider F (uIII(1) ). Suppose that F (u
III
(1) ) 6= z. But then, voters in profile
uIII1 with preferences

xy
z

 will misreport as

xz
y

 with a coalition size of k < ε,
inducing profile uIII(1) and improved result over z. This would contradict WSP, so
we know that F (uIII(1) ) = z.
Now, assume for a general j that F (uIII(j) ) = z. We can show that it follows that
F (uIII(j+1)) = z. Suppose instead that F (u
III
(j+1)) 6= z. But then, voters in profile
uIII(j) with preferences

xy
z

 will misreport as

xz
y

 with a coalition size of k < ε,
inducing profile uIII(j+1), and improved outcome x. This would contradict WSP,
meaning that F (uIII(j+1)) = z. This is true for any general j. In particular, this is
true for:
uIII(n) =
a + b - nk nk c 1 - a - b - c
x x y y
y z z x
z y x z
=
a + k b - k c 1 - a - b - c
x x y y
y z z x
z y x z
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But now, note that voters in profile uIII(n) with preferences

xy
z

 will misreport as

xz
y

 with a coalition size of k, inducing profile uIII. and evaluation (I18), yielding
improved outcome y over z. So, 3.III.1.2 fails to hold.
3.III.1.3 Instead, we have that:
F (uIII1 ) = y
Where:
uIII1 =
a + b c 1 - a - b - c
x y y
y z x
z x z
a+ b > 1− a− b
But then, consider the following relabeling of the weights on profile uIII1 .
uIII1 =
a + b c 1 - a - b - c
x y y
y z x
z x z
=
A B 1 - A - B
x y y
y z x
z x z
Where: a+ b = A > 12 .
But then, note that in 3.II.1, we showed that for a generic profile u∗, and voting
rule F (satisfying P, A, N, and WSP), where:
u∗ =
a∗ b∗ 1− a∗ − b∗
x y y
y z x
z x z
F (u∗) = y
a∗ >
1
2
Then:
F


a∗ 1− a∗
x y
y x
z z

 = y
But, as we showed in 3.II.1, this led to a contradiction with WSP.
So, 3.III.1 is impossible.
3.III.2 Instead we suppose that
F (uIII. ) = y (I19)
Again, we consider the following profile:
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uIII1 =
a + b c 1 - a - b - c
x y y
y z x
z x z
3.III.2.1 Suppose that
F (uIII1 ) = x
Case 3.III.2.1.1
But then, voters in profile uIII. with preferences

xz
y

 will misreport as

xy
z


with a coalition size of b, inducing profile uIII1 and improved result x. This would
contradict WSP, so Case 3.III.2.1.1 fails to hold.
Case 3.III.1.1.n+1 nε ≤ b < (n+ 1)ε
Consider the following profile:
uIII(j) =
a + b - jk jk c 1 - a - b - c
x x y y
y z z x
z y x z
Here, k = b
n+1 , and j iterates from 1 to n. Note that the definition of u
III
(j) is
local to this case.
We first consider F (uIII(1) ). Suppose that F (u
III
(1) ) 6= x. But then, voters in profile
uIII(1) with preferences

xz
y

 will misreport as

xy
z

 with a coalition size of k < ε,
inducing profile uIII1 and improved result x. This would contradict WSP, so we
know that F (uIII(1) ) = x.
Now, assume for a general j that F (uIII(j) ) = x. We can show that it follows
that F (uIII(j+1)) = x. Suppose instead that F (u
III
(j+1)) 6= x. But then, voters in
profile uIII(j+1) with preferences

xz
y

 will misreport as

xy
z

 with a coalition size of
k < ε, inducing profile uIII(j) , and improved outcome x. This would contradict WSP,
meaning that F (uIII(j+1)) = x. This is true for any general j. In particular, this is
true for:
uIII(n) =
a + b - nk nk c 1 - a - b - c
x x y y
y z z x
z y x z
=
a + k b - k c 1 - a - b - c
x x y y
y z z x
z y x z
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But now, note that voters in profile uIII. with preferences

xz
y

 will misreport
as

xy
z

 with a coalition size of k, inducing profile uIII(n) and improved outcome x
over z. So, 3.III.2.1 fails to hold.
3.III.2.2 Suppose that
F (uIII1 ) = y
But, using the same logic as with 3.III.1.3, this will fail to satisfy WSP.
3.III.2.3 So, we are left with:
F (uIII1 ) = z
Consider the following profile:
uIII2 =
a + c 1 - a - c
y y
z x
x z
We see that y must be the winner (by property P).
Case 3.III.2.3.1 0 ≤ a+ b < ε
Here, voters in profile uIII1 with preferences

xy
z

 will misreport as

yz
x

 with a
weight of a, and will misreport as

yx
z

 with a weight of b. This will create profile
uIII2 , resulting in improved outcome y over z. This would contradict WSP, meaning
that Case 3.III.2.3.1 fails to hold.
Case 3.III.2.3.n+1 nε ≤ a+ b < (n+ 1)ε
Now, consider the following profile:
uIII(j) =
a + b - j(k + m) c + jk 1 - a - b - c + jm
x y y
y z x
z x z
Here, k = a
n+1 and m =
b
n+1 . Also, j iterates from 1 to n. Note that this
definition of uIII(j) is local to this case.
We consider the evaluation F (uIII(1) ). Suppose that F (u
III
(1) ) 6= z. But then, voters
in profile uIII1 with preferences

xy
z

 will misreport as

yz
x

 with a weight of k,
and will misreport as

yx
z

 with a weight of m. This would induce profile uIII(1) and
would result in an improved outcome over z. This would contradict WSP, meaning
that F (uIII(1) ) = z.
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Now, assume for some general j that F (uIII(j) ) = z. We can show that F (u
III
(j+1)) =
z. Suppose instead that F (uIII(j+1)) 6= z. But then, voters in profile u
III
(j) with
preferences

xy
z

 will misreport as

yz
x

 with a weight of k, and will misreport as

yx
z

 with a weight of m. This would induce profile uIII(j+1) and would result in
an improved outcome over z. So, for a general j, we have that F (uIII(j+1)) = z. In
particular, this is true for the following profile:
uIII(n) =
a + b - n(k + m) c + nk 1 - a - b - c + nm
x y y
y z x
z x z
=
(k + m) a + c - k 1 - a - c - m
x y y
y z x
z x z
But then, note that voters in profile uIII(n) with preferences

xy
z

 will misreport as

yz
x

 with a weight of k, and will misreport as

yx
z

 with a weight of m. This will
induce profile uIII2 , resulting in improved outcome y over z. This would contradict
WSP, meaning that Case 3.III.2.3.n+1 fails to hold in general.
So, we see that there is no voting rule F other than the Condorcet method that
satisfies the axioms P, A, N, and WSP on a rich domain. This concludes Step 3,
and concludes the proof of the theorem.
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